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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines how voters react towards candidates with records of mis-
use of public funds in the context of sub-national elections in Brazil. Its contribution
to the extant literature on corruption and electoral accountability is twofold. First,
it is the rst study to inquire whether voters punish candidates with malfeasance
records running for both executive and legislative oce in the same electoral context
and whether a number of contextual factors aect electoral accountability in these
oces. Second, it presents and tests new hypotheses on the type of motivation that
ground voters' rejection towards corrupt candidates.
In chapter 2, I examine whether voters punish candidates for mayor and city coun-
cilman with accounts rejected by the Brazilian Audit Courts and whether additional
contextual factors aect electoral accountability. In particular, I study whether elec-
toral accountability decreases as candidates (for mayor) have better records of social
provision; whether local media promotes electoral accountability; and whether candi-
dates with negative antecedents receive fewer campaign donations and are less likely
to re-run. I combine large-N observational analysis, using an original dataset with
candidates' accounts rejection records, with interviews with Brazilian Audit Court
members and local politicians. In chapter 3 I use three online survey experiments
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with a convenience sample of Brazilian voters to examine whether likelihood to sup-
port a corrupt incumbent is aected by the details that subjects learn about the
corruption incident. I use these additional details to inquire whether subjects are
sensitive to information emphasizing the public costs of corruption, the candidate's
moral misbehavior, or his illicit enrichment.
Results presented in chapter 2 suggest that prior records of misuse of public funds
have electoral consequences both for candidates for mayor and for city councilman.
In addition, they suggest that the existence of local media does not increase elec-
toral punishment; that public spending does not reduce electoral punishment; and
that candidates with accounts rejected often receive fewer funds and are less likely to
re-run. Results presented in chapter 3 suggest that voters' rejection towards corrupt
candidates is stronger when they learn additional details on the candidate's illegal
enrichment.
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1. Introduction
The spread of corruption in democratic polities is a key concern for the interna-
tional community. While elections should provide strong selection eects against
corrupt politicians, experience shows that they often manege to successfully partici-
pate in the electoral game. This paradox has stimulated a growing scholarly interest
on how voters react towards candidates facing corruption accusations. Scholars have
addressed various questions, including whether these candidates see their share of
votes reduced, whether voters are typically informed about corruption accusations,
and whether there are other factors that increase or decrease electoral accountability.
Although there seems to be a consensus that these candidates lose at least part
of their share of votes when facing serious corruption accusations, there still remain
various puzzles. First, an aspect still understudied is whether the electoral punish-
ment is similar across dierent government levels and oces. Prior scholarship has
mostly focused on candidates for executive oce at the municipal level (Ferraz & Fi-
nan 2008, Costas-Perez et al. 2012, De Figueiredo, Hidalgo & Kasahara 2010, Chong
et al. 2015, Pereira & Melo 2015) and candidates for legislative oce at the national
level (Chang et al 2010, Peters & Welch 1980, Pereira, Renno & Samuels 2011). But
little is known about whether electoral punishment varies for candidates for execu-
tive versus legislative oce. There are a number of factors that might aect electoral
accountability across dierent oces, such as the level of diusion of the corruption
accusation, the responsibilities for each oce that might make the corruption accu-
sation more or less severe, and the electoral system.
Second, studies have assessed a number of factors that might condition electoral
punishment, such as availability of local media, or candidate's records of social pro-
vision. However, there are often contradictory ndings. For instance, while Ferraz &
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Finan (2008) nd that the availability of local media is key to informs voters about
corruption accusations, Pereira & Melo (2015) nd a non statistically signicant re-
lationship between availability of local media and electoral punishment. Similarly,
while Winters & Weitz-Shapiro (2013) nd no evidence that voters condone corrup-
tion when the candidate has good records of social provision, Melo & Pereira (2015)
nd that as candidates have better records of social provision the electoral punish-
ment disappears. Hence more empirical evidence is needed.
Third, there is little knowledge on the type of reasoning behind voters' assessment
of corrupt candidates. Even when we know that all else being equal voters will reject
corrupt candidates, their rejection might be grounded on dierent motivations, such
as a moral rejection of the candidate's lack of integrity, or an evaluation of the pos-
sible costs of the corrupt misuse of public oce.
This dissertation combines a variety of approaches to examine how voters react
towards candidates with prior evidence of misuse of public funds in the context of
municipal elections in Brazil. In particular, I address three questions: a) do voters
punish candidates with records of malfeasance of public funds?; b) what is the im-
pact, if any, of other contextual factors such as candidates' records of social provision
and the availability of local media?; and c) is the voters' reaction aected by the
specic details they learn on the candidates' malfeasance records? I use a variety
of approaches to address these questions, including large-N observational analysis,
survey experiments and interviews with Audit Courts members and local politicians
in Brazil.
In chapter 1 I combine large-N observational analysis with interviews to examine
if voters punish candidates for mayor and city councilman with malfeasance records
in the context of the 2008 and 2012 elections. In addition, I examine whether elec-
toral accountability decreases as candidates (for mayor) have better records of social
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provision; whether local media promotes electoral accountability; and whether candi-
dates with negative antecedents receive fewer campaign donations and are less likely
to re-run in the following elections.
I use a unique database, built for this project, with candidates' records of misuse
of public funds in the 34 Federal, State and Municipal Brazilian Audit Courts be-
tween 2004 and 2012. To run the analysis I use matching with dierence-in-dierence
estimation techniques and regression analysis. This section is complemented with
interviews with members of the Audit Courts, elected ocials and their sta in four
states in Brazil, two states in the relatively less developed Northeast region and two
states in the more advanced Southeast region1. I use interviews to understand how
Audit Courts' decisions are publicized by both the media and by the Courts them-
selves. With these interviews I aim to reconstruct how, and to what extent, voters
are informed about candidates' records.
In chapter 2 I use three online survey experiments with a national sample of
Brazilian voters to understand whether likelihood to support a corrupt incumbent is
aected by the details that subjects learn about the corruption incident. The exper-
iments present a hypothetical incumbent mayor running for reelection with records
of misuse of public funds. Subjects are presented with either a \limited informa-
tion" vignette in which they receive scant information on the negative records, or one
of various \extended information" vignettes in which they learn more details about
these records. I test whether providing additional information on the public costs of
corruption, on the benets (for the mayor) of the corruption incident, or additional
information on the mayor's dishonest behavior aects likelihood to support his re-
election.
1The four states are Pernambuco and Ceara in the Northeast and Rio de Janeiro and S~ao Paulo
in the Southeast.
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This multi-methods approach is used to capture various aspects of electoral ac-
countability. I use the experimental strategy in order to manipulate the treatment of
interest -i.e. corruption- in a controlled setting. This method is the most appropri-
ate to examine how small variations in the information received by subjects impacts
on their subsequent support for a corrupt candidate. More generally, experimental
designs can be used to incorporate and test new theories that could hardly be tested
with alternative designs.
I use a large-N approach to understand whether voters punish candidates with
negative antecedents and whether contextual factors -which can be measured in real
settings- can aect their support. The observational setting enhances the external
validity of ndings and oers various advantages over experimental designs. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each methodological strategy are discussed below.
Studies dealing with electoral accountability and corruption typical address either
of two questions: a) do voters support corrupt incumbents?; and b) what other fac-
tors have an impact on voters' support (rejection) for corrupt incumbents?
Survey experiments oer various advantages to address the second question. The
possibility to manipulate the treatment of interest plus any additional factor makes
it relatively easy to incorporate new theories and test them with strong internal va-
lidity. For instance, Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2015a) and Botero et al. (2015) study
whether the credibility of the source of information (of the corruption incident) aects
voters' support for a corrupt incumbent; Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2015b) examine
whether the public reaction changes if the ocial accused is the mayor running for
reelection or a non elected ocial under his responsibility; Klasnja and Tucker (2013)
and Winters & Weitz-Shapiro (2013) study whether voters are less willing to punish
a corrupt mayor if he has good records of public works completed and good records of
economic growth; Anduiza et al. (2013) and Rundquist et al. (1977) study if voters
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are less willing to punish a corrupt incumbent if he runs for the party they support
or has similar preferences on specic issue positions. All these studies consider the
eect of additional variables on electoral accountability.
However, survey (and lab) experiments could lead to less reliable estimates of the
eect of corruption on electoral behavior as they can potentially overestimate the ef-
fect. First, in survey experiments the information of the corruption incident is always
accessible and salient, as it was provided by the researcher. In real settings voters
might not learn about those accusations and if they do, they will arguably learn them
in a context where more issues are debated -within the campaign- which will make
them less salient.2 In addition, survey experiments measure the outcome immediately
after subjects are informed of the corruption incident. Hence, this information is more
likely to be salient in their mind when measuring the outcome variable. In contrast,
in real setting elections might take place several months -or years- after voters rst
learnt about the incident. The eect of information on behavior might weaken its
eect with time, which might be another source of overestimation of treatment eect
in survey experiments3.
Observational studies oer various advantages over experimental methods and
have other limits as well. They don't require the assumption that voters know about
the corruption accusation. In addition, they don't require making the information
articially salient for voters. Moreover, they allow us to capture the specic eect
of information provision by specic outlets, such as the local media (Finan & Ferraz
2008, Pereira & Melo 2015) or national newspapers (Chang et al. 2010, Costas-Perez
et al. 2012).
2Field experiments provide an interesting alternative to overcome this problem as voters learn
the accusation in a context of a real campaign, where other issues are in the debate.
3However, if other candidates use this information during the campaign voters, the treatment
will be salient immediately before the election.
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However, they tend to oer more limited possibilities in terms of developing new
theories, as researchers can't manipulate the information received by subjects. The
testing of very specic alterations in the information received by subjects might only
be attainable in controlled -i.e. experimental- settings. In addition, testing the eect
of real world corruption accusations could result in less reliable estimates given the
heterogeneity of these cases, as some accusations could be more severe than others.
In sum, empirical studies on electoral accountability should use a wide array of
methodological strategies to gauge dierent aspects of it. Among the various ques-
tions that this eld of study still needs to address, we should consider: a) whether
voters receive the information (on the candidates' corruption antecedents); b) the
duration of eects; c) whether the treatment could be categorized as binary (i.e. cor-
rupt/non corrupt) or ordinal (i.e. distinguishing various levels of corruption); d) what
other contextual factors play a role in this process.
This dissertation presents new empirical evidence showing that prior records of
misuse of public funds have electoral consequences. This nding is consistent across
the two chapters, and consistent with prior studies. As chapter 2 shows, this is consis-
tent for both candidates for mayor and for city councilman. In competitive elections,
such the those for City Council legislator, the loss of votes that can be attributed
to the accounts rejection might have a stronger eect on the likelihood of election.
The rst experiment in chapter 3 also presents strong evidence that prior misuse of
public funds is strongly punished. In addition, results presented in chapter 2 suggests
that this punishment is less contingent upon the existence of local media than argued
in prior studies (Ferraz & Finan 2008); and that other elite based mechanisms of
accountability, such as the amount of campaign donations that candidates receive,
can have a relevant role in the process of accountability.
Evidence presented in chapter 3 shows that voters' rejection increases as they learn
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additional information on candidate's illegal enrichment, while additional information
on the public costs of corruption doesn't necessarily increase the electoral costs of cor-
ruption accusations. This is consistent with evidence presented in chapter 2, which
shows no evidence that more public spending decreases electoral punishment. This
evidence shows that voters do not weigh candidate's corruption antecedents in terms
of the prospective costs on their wellbeing. Their judgment is more likely based on a
rejection of the politicians' illegal use the public funds for their own enrichment.
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2. The Eect of Accounts Rejection on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence
from Brazilian Municipal Elections
Abstract
Do voters punish candidates with records of misuse of public funds? I address this
question in the context of the 2008 and 2012 municipal elections for mayor and City
Council legislator in Brazil using interviews and econometric analysis. I use inter-
views with Audit Courts' board members and ocials and local politicians across four
Brazilian states to describe how and to what extent Audit Courts' decisions reach the
public. Analysis of interviews shows signicant diusion of those decisions by various
channels, including local media, internet, social media and electoral campaigns. I use
a unique dataset built for this project listing all candidates with accounts rejection
records by any of the 34 Brazilian Audit Courts between 2004 and 2012. To test the
eect of accounts rejection on electoral returns I use a variety of methods, including
matching and dierence-in-dierence and regression analysis. Results show strong
evidence that voters punish both candidates for mayor and City Council legislator
in most elections. I subsequently consider the eect of various moderators listed in
prior studies, including the existence of local media, campaign donations received by
the candidates, and the use of public spending to diminish electoral punishment (in
the case of incumbent mayors). Results show evidence that contradicts ndings from
prior scholarship. The existence of local media doesn't increase electoral punishment
-and it can even decrease it in some elections-; public spending doesn't reduce electoral
punishment; and candidates with accounts rejected often receive fewer funds. Overall
these results show that in the context of widespread information through various chan-
nels voters punish candidates for mayor and city councilman with records of accounts
10
rejection, and none of those mediators have a signicant role.
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2.1 Introduction
In democratic polities, electoral accountability is a key mechanism to oust corrupt
elites from government. Despite the successful transitions to democracy in great part
of the developing world, this mechanism has often failed to remove corrupt elites
both at the national and sub-national level. This paradox has stimulated a num-
ber of empirical studies on electoral accountability and corruption.4 The number of
observational studies has remained relatively limited as compared to the growth of
studies using eld and survey experiments.5 This can be explained by the practi-
cal diculties that hamper the growth of observational studies: researchers need to
identify and collect data of elections with a signicant number of candidates facing
corruption accusations for prior oce holding. These data are often hard to nd and
its collection requires signicant time and eort. Given these limitations, it is not
surprising that there are no observational studies testing the eect of malfeasance
accusations on electoral outcomes for both candidates in legislative and executive
oces in the same electoral context.
This is the rst study to examine electoral punishment to candidates with malfea-
sance records in elections for both legislative and executive oce. It uses an original
dataset that lists all candidates for mayor and City Council legislator with records of
accounts rejection by any of the 34 Brazilian Audit Courts between 2004 and 2012.
A few prior studies have analyzed the eect of corruption on subsequent electoral
returns for legislative oce at the national level (Peters and Welch 1980, Chang,
4There is a large number of studies tackling this question, including Rundquist, Strom & Peters
(1977), Klasnja & Tucker (2013), Andiuza et al. (2013), Ferraz & Finan (2008), Chang, Golden &
Hill (2010), Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2013), Costas-Perez, Sole-Olle & Sorribas-Navarro (2012),
Palau & Davesa (2013), Botero et al. (2015), Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2015a, 2015b), Pereira &
Melo (2015), Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2013).
5Among the exceptions we should include Ferraz & Finan (2008), Andiuza et al. (2013), Pereira
& Melo (2015), Peters and Welch (1980), Chang et al. (2010), Pereira, Renno & Samuels (2011).
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Goldman & Hill 2010, Pereira, Renno & Samuels 2011) and for executive oce at
the municipal level (Ferraz & Finan 2008, Costas-Perez et al. 2012, De Figueiredo,
Hidalgo & Kasahara 2010, Chong et al. 2015, Pereira & Melo 2015) but this is the
rst study to analyze this issue in the same electoral context for both executive and
legislative oce, and the rst one to study electoral accountability for legislative oce
at the sub-national level. It takes advantage of an electoral system for legislative oce
-open list proportional representation- that allows voters to select among candidates
within the same party6. Hence, they can avoid selecting candidates with accounts
rejection without the need to shift their party of choice.
In addition, I study the role of additional factors that have been listed as moder-
ators in prior scholarship. In particular, I test whether the availability of local media
increases electoral accountability, whether accountability diminishes as -incumbent-
candidates have better records of social provision, and whether candidates with ac-
counts rejected receive fewer campaign donations.
The econometric analyzes are complemented with interviews with Audit Court
members and local candidates to investigate how this information is publicized. In-
terviews were conducted in four Brazilian states, two in the relatively more advanced
Southeast region and two in the relatively less developed Northeast.7 I aim to recon-
struct to what extent and by what channels voters learn about these decisions.
2.2 Previous Studies
A majority of studies on electoral accountability towards corrupt candidates suggest
6Voters can choose either one party as a whole or an individual candidate within the party, but
most voters select individual candidates
7The four states are Pernambuco and Ceara in the Northeast and Rio de Janeiro and S~ao Paulo
in the Southeast.
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that they receive an electoral punishment (Ferraz and Finan 2008, Pereira, Renno
and Samuels 2011, Chong et al. 2015, Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2013, Weitz-Shapiro
& Winters 2015a, 2015b, Klasnja & Tucker 2013, Pereira & Melo 2015), although
this doesn't necessarily prevents their reelection (Peters and Welch 1980)8. This nd-
ing seems to hold for national legislative elections (Peters and Welch 1980, Chang,
Golden & Hill 2010) and for local executive oce (Ferraz & Finan 2008, Pereira &
Melo 2015, Chong et al. 2015).
However, there is currently no scholarly consensus on whether punishment is af-
fected by contextual factors such as media attention on corruption accusations and
incumbent candidate's records of social provision. Ferraz and Finan (2008) nd that
voters are more likely to punish incumbents who received negative audits in Brazilian
local elections in municipalities with at least one local radio (the most inuential me-
dia in the majority of Brazilian municipalities). Similarly, Chang, Golden, and Hill
(2010) nd that electoral punishment towards Italian legislators accused of corruption
since 1948 was virtually nonexistent until the early 1990s, when electoral accountabil-
ity increased as a result of more media coverage of corruption scandals. Those studies
suggest that media attention is a key factor in promoting electoral accountability.
Winters & Weitz Shapiro (2013) use a survey experiment in Brazil to test the
\trade o" hypothesis (i.e. that voters are willing to condone corrupt candidates
with good record of social provision) versus the \information hypothesis" (i.e. that
voters will punish those candidates if they have sucient information on the corrup-
tion records). They nd that voters do punish corrupt incumbents regardless of their
social provision records. This nding is challenged by Pereira & Melo (2015) in a
study on the eect of negative audits on electoral outcomes in one Brazilian state.
8In contrast, Banerjee et al (2010) nd no punishment eect in India, while De Figueiredo, Hidalgo
& Kasahara (2010) nd that only one of two competing candidates with corruption antecedents
receive electoral punishment
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They nd that public spending decreases the negative impact of corruption on re-
election likelihood (the \trade o hypothesis"). They also nd that existence of local
radios doesn't signicantly decrease reelection chances of corrupt incumbents.
Observational studies are better suited to test the information hypothesis, as in
both eld and survey experiments the researcher is providing the treatment to sub-
jects. With the only exception of Pereira & Melo (2015) those studies suggest that
media has a prominent role. In particular, in the Brazilian context, Ferraz and Finan
(2008) argue that local radios have a key role in making information on corruption
accessible to the public. However, we also know that in Brazilian municipalities local
radios are often owned or controlled by local political elites (Boas & Hidalgo 2011,
Boas 2014). If mayors with negative audits are the owners of local radios, then they
will make sure that either information on those records is not accessible to the public,
or they will use the media to make their case against the procedures or ndings of
those audits.
A dierent hypothesis, posited by Pereira, Renno & Samuels (2011), is that cor-
rupt incumbents see their share of campaign donations reduced. This would be an
alternative channel by which those candidates receive an electoral punishment. They
test this hypothesis in the context of federal legislative elections in Brazil and nd
that corrupt incumbents suer a signicant loss in their campaign donations.
This paper provides a new empirical test on the information and campaign dona-
tions hypotheses for both local legislative and executive elections and on the trade
o hypothesis for local executive elections (which is the oce that can claim credit
on public spending).
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2.3 Accounts Rejection in Brazilian Municipal Governments
Audit Court's role is sanctioned by the Brazilian constitution, and consists in control-
ling the use of public funds at all levels of public administration, including the three
government branches. Although formally they take part in the legislative branch,
they operate as quasi-independent judicial authorities, enjoying secure tenure until
retirement (similar to the judicial authorities), and operate with procedures similar to
the judicial bodies, such as right of reply and collegial decision making (Melo, Pereira
and Figueiredo 2009: 1224).
All local governments -as well as the federal and state governments- are required
to annually present reports of their use of public funds to show that they have been
used according to the norms and procedures of public administration. Accounts sub-
mitted to the Audit Courts can be approved, approved with reservations, or rejected.
Decisions are reach by a body of board members.
Mayors have the most important responsibilities in managing the municipal funds
and consequently are particularly subjects of oversight by the Audit Courts. The
most frequent cases of account rejection for mayors are: a) failure to comply with
the laws requiring to spend at least 25% of municipal total expenditures in education
and at least 15% in public health; b) over-expenses, no-bid purchases and use of fake
receipts; c) mismanagement of pension funds; d) failure to present accounts to the
Audit Court9.
The president of the City Council has various specic responsibilities audited by
the Audit Courts. In particular, they are responsible for setting the annual expenses
of the Council in accordance to the law, for managing the contributions to social pen-
9This enumeration is drawn from interviews with various Audit Court board members across four
states in Brazil (interview with Ramalho 2016, interview with an anonymous board member of the
State of Pernambuco Audit Court 2015, interview with Ponte 2015, interview with Massa 2015).
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sions of city councilmen, for setting their salaries, and for managing the funds of the
Council | although each city councilmen might manage funds allocated specically
for him. These responsibilities might render them subject to accounts rejection for
the following reasons: a) exceeding the limit of annual expenses of the City Council,
which should range between 5 and 8 percent of total municipal income10; b) exceed-
ing the allowed limit on the annual salaries of city councilmen -also established by
law-; c) failing to pay or provide proof of contribution to the social pensions of city
councilmen; d ) over-expenses, no-bid purchases and use of fake receipts in the use of
Council funds for purchases or hiring sta.
In addition, all city councilmen might be subject to accounts rejection for the use
of City Council funds provided for specic duty related expenses. The most common
cases of account rejection for city councilmen are: a) over-expenses, no-bid purchases
and use of fake receipts; b) exceeding reasonable expenses in hiring sta; c) use of
public funds in travel expenses for trips unrelated to their City Council duties11.
In case of a Court decision to reject accounts, there are ve possible instances
of appeal to reconsider the decision. Once all possibilities of appeal have been ex-
hausted, the rejection of accounts is considered denitive. In the case of mayors, this
decision needs to be conrmed by 2/3 of the City Council (the Audit Court's decision
is labeled a \pre-assessment").
There are two pieces of legislation that aect candidates' eligibility for oce after
accounts rejection. The rst one is a law passed in 1990 which sanctions that all
citizens who had denitive accounts rejection by an Audit Court (i.e. there are no
10The annual budget of the municipal council is in practice determined by the council. While the
mayor in theory can reject the municipal council budget this does not happen in practice. Hence,
municipal councils have few incentives to abide to the constitutional limit (Mendes 2009).
11Interview with Ramalho 2016, interview with an anonymous board member of the State of
Pernambuco Audit Court 2015, interview with Ponte 2015, interview with Massa 2015, interview
with an anonymous board member substitute of the State of Pernambuco Audit Court 2015.
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possibilities of appeal) due to an act of administrative mismanagement that involves
intention are ineligible for 8 years12. In the case of mayors, this restriction only applies
when the Audit Court's decision was conrmed by 2/3 of the City Council. More
recently, in 2012, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of the recently
sanctioned \Clean Records" law, which extends non eligibility for all ocials who had
accounts rejected by the Audit Court's collegial board, that is, in any instance even
before all possible appeals have been exhausted.
Had these laws been eectively imposed, electors wouldn't have the choice to select
a candidate with antecedents of accounts rejection. In practice, however, candidates
have various ways to circumvent this restriction using dierent legal subterfuges.
First, the candidacy to be banned should be impeached by the Electoral Tribunal,
the Electoral Prosecutor's Oce (Ministerio Publico Eleitoral), a political party or
another candidate within 5 days of request of registration of candidacy to the Elec-
toral Tribunal (Wargas Neto 2010). Once that period has passed, the candidate is
eligible if his candidacy was not contested.
Second, even if the accounts rejection exhausted all possibilities of appeal in the
Audit Court, the candidate can appeal the formal aspects of the decision to the Ju-
diciary13 (Wargas Neto 2010: 9). While the Judiciary reconsiders the decision, the
impeachment of the candidacy is annulled and the candidate will be able to run for
oce, as the nal decision will usually take place after the election. The raising of
the impeachment takes place regardless of the merits of the demand, so candidates
can present an appeal with any argument on the eve of the election and often the
nal decision of justice (which might attain the annulment of the votes received by
12According to the jurisprudence of the Superior Electoral Tribunal of Brazil this act should
involve an administrative wrongdoing involving intentionality, aecting the public interest, seeking
a private advantage of the ocial, which might be non material (Wargas Neto 2004: 11).
13In this case, the Judiciary cannot overrule the Courts decision based on its content, but it can
object the procedural mechanisms followed to reach such decision.
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the candidate) takes place long after, which obviously undermines the eectiveness of
the whole process (Wargas Neto 2010: 13).
Various Audit Court members conrmed in interviews with the author that it is
not hard for a candidate to appeal their decision using a variety of arguments, as long
as the appeal doesn't involve the substance of the Court's decision but rather the
formal procedures of it14. As an experienced local politician explains, the candidate
might argue, for instance, that a specic document was not accepted in his defense
under the Audit Court; this would be enough to open a process under the Judiciary
-which will probably take years- and will temporarily annul the Audit Court's de-
cision, allowing him to run in the election (interview with an anonymous legislator
in the State Assembly of Ceara 2015). Some of the concepts used in the legislation
required for ineligibility are rather vague, such as administrative incapability, leaving
another possible subterfuge for appeals to the Judiciary (interview with Massa 2015).
Candidates can also argue that the administrative action for which they were charged
was not intentional (interview with an anonymous board member substitute of the
State of Pernambuco Audit Court 2015, interview with Pimentel 2015). Within the
Judiciary tends to prevail the idea of presumption of innocence and hence candidacies
tend to be accepted (interview with Massa 2015). However, some candidates refrain
from appealing to the Judiciary as they could nd it dicult to follow the required
judicial procedures while at the same time running the campaign (interview with Ra-
malho 2016).
In this fashion, 1,572 candidates who run for City Councils in 2008 had their ac-
counts rejected between 2008 and 2012 (out of a total number of 321,127 candidates
14Interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry in the Municipal Audit Court of
Ceara 2015, interview with an anonymous board member of the State Audit Court of Pernambuco
2015, interview with an anonymous state legislator in the State Assembly of Ceara 2015, interview
with Pimentel 2015, interview with Massa 2015.
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who run in the 2008 election); 510 of them attempted to re-run in the 2012 election
(345 of them had been incumbents in the 2008 election); and 458 successfully regis-
tered to run in 2012. In the case of candidates for mayor, 1,027 candidates for mayor
in 2008 had accounts rejected between 2008 and 2012 and 144 relisted in the 2012
election.
The number of candidates with records of accounts rejection in any given elec-
tion doesn't restrict to incumbents. Candidates might have accounts rejected for any
prior oce holding -as the process of denitive accounts rejection might take several
years-. The issue of whether accounts rejection might impact on candidates decision
to re-run is further discussed in section 10.
There are two institutional features of Audit Courts that might make them less ef-
fective in punishing corrupt mayors. First, a portion of these members are appointed
by the state executive15 -subject to the approval of a simple majority of the state
legislature- with few restrictions, or by the legislature itself. Hidalgo et al. (forth-
coming) show that because many of these members are retired politicians with links
to the local elites, they are less prone to reject municipal accounts16. This evidence is
consistent with critics charging that the Audit Courts' design is ineective (Hidalgo et
al., forthcoming). This characteristic would potentially result in less punitive Courts
(since some corrupt mayors might end up not being punished) but not biased towards
prosecuting non-corrupt mayors (which could result in decisions of accounts rejection
non credible for the public). Second, Melo, Pereira and Figueiredo (2009) show that
the eectiveness of Audit Courts varies across states being positively related to power
alternation and negatively related to voter volatility. This feature could make some
state Audit Courts more eective in detecting corrupt politicians than others. This
15Or by the municipal executive in the few cases where there are specic Municipal Audit Courts.
16According to one interviewee this pro-government bias is more pronounced in the case of state
governors that in the case of mayors (interview with Pacheco 2016).
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wouldn't aect their negative decisions' credibility (insofar as this feature doesn't
result in non corrupt ocials being sanctioned), but would make less credible their
positive decisions (to not reject ocials' accounts).
2.4 Publicity of Audit Courts' Decisions
If electors are not aware of Audit Courts' decisions they will not punish condemned
candidates. It is important, hence, to describe in detail how, and to what extent,
Audit Courts' decisions receive publicity.
All Brazilian Audit Courts' sessions are open to the public and their most relevant
decisions -such as those involving local governments' accounts- are published in their
websites. In some states, all sessions are broadcasted online (interview with Ramalho
2016). In others, cases of larger public repercussion, such as those judging municipal
governments' accounts, are broadcasted by local TV stations (interview with Ponte
2015).
Arguably, a more eective source of publicity comes from the Audit Courts' links
with the media. Audit Courts often have specialized ocials who work closely with the
media on the diusion of decisions that involve accounts rejection of elected ocials
(interview with Massa 2015, interview with Ramalho 2015, interview with Pimentel
2015). They daily select among all Courts decisions those that might be of interest
for the press and submit them to local newspapers and radio stations. Audit Courts
can also allocate specic budget for this purpose. For instance, the Audit Court of
the state of Pernambuco has two weekly paid columns in the two main state newspa-
pers. Those columns are used to inform the public on the main Audit Courts weekly
decisions, including those aecting mayors' accounts (interview with an anonymous
board member substitute in the State of Pernambuco Audit Court). As an Audit
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Court Board Member explains, the Courts are expensive public structures; therefore,
they understand that one of their main tasks is to show the public that they have
a productive role for the community (interview with an anonymous board member
substitute of the State of Pernambuco Audit Court 2015).
The media has a continuous interest in news involving elected ocials' accounts
rejection.17 Some outlets might even have specialized reporters who attend daily the
Audit Court sessions covering the most relevant decisions (interview with an anony-
mous ocial of the Public Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara 2015).
Those specialized reporters often have their own blogs where they reprint and cover
Audit Courts news with more detail (interview with an anonymous ocial of the
Public Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara 2015). Accounts rejection
involving use of federal funds (in which case it is responsibility of the Federal Audit
Court to reject accounts) typically reaches the national media. According to one
interviewee, it is very common to see in the O Globo headlines (one of the main
newspapers in Brazil) news involving decisions by the Federal Audit Court (interview
with Barbosa de Souza 2016).
Radio stations are largely the most inuential media outlet in Brazil, as news-
papers have very low rates of circulation (Ferraz & Finan 2008). Even when TV
might reach an even higher number of Brazilians (97.1 % as compared to 72.1 % of
Brazilians with access to radios) the number of municipalities with local TV outlets
is rather limited (only 4%) (IBGE 2014, Speck & Cervi 2015). Hence, those outlets
will not include coverage of local events in most municipalities. In contrast, 67% of
municipalities have their own radio station, which will typically cover local events
17Interview with Ramalho 2015, interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry of the
State Audit Court of Ceara 2015, interview with Pimentel 2015, interview with an anonymous legis-
lator of the State Assembly of Ceara 2015, interview with Ponte 2015, interview with an anonymous
board member substitute of the State of Pernambuco Audit Court 2015).
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(Speck & Cervi 2015).
Local radio stations have a very active role in the diusion of news of accounts
rejection of local governments (interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public
Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara 2015, interview with Pimentel 2015).
Those stations have a multiplying eect on the diusion of news on Audit Courts' de-
cisions published in other outlets which might have a more limited circulation, such
as newspapers or specialized blogs18. As one experienced local politician explains,
blogs, social media, and newspapers are very active in publishing news on corruption
and Audit Courts' decisions, and radio stations pick up those news and amplify the
diusion (interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry of the Munici-
pal Audit Court of Ceara 2015).
However, these stations are often owned or controlled by local political bosses
(Boas 2014, Boas & Hidalgo 2011), in which case those news will receive little diu-
sion. The degree of inuence might be conditioned by the size of the municipality:
larger municipalities have more media diversity; making it harder for any local boss
to have complete control of it. According to various interviewees, when mayors from
larger municipalities have accounts rejected, that news will receive substantive me-
dia attention, at least by some non controlled outlets (interview with Pimentel 2015,
interview with an anonymous board member substitute of the State of Pernambuco
Audit Court 2015). That news might even reach the main state outlets, such as state
newspapers and local TVs (interview with an anonymous legislator of the State of
Ceara Assembly 2015). In contrast, the diusion of news of accounts rejection of
mayors from smaller municipalities might be contingent upon the existence of radio
stations owned or inuenced by opponent politicians (interview with an anonymous
18Interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of
Ceara 2015, interview with an anonymous legislator of the State Assembly of Ceara 2015, interview
with Pimentel 2015, interview with Ramalho 2015.
23
ocial of the Public Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara 2015).
Another important source of diusion are blogs. Many specialized blogs (often
owned by specialized journalists) regularly report on Audit Courts' publicly relevant
decisions (interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry of the Munici-
pal Audit Court of Ceara 2015, interview with Pimentel 2015). Although their public
reach might be limited, they are a common source of information for radio stations,
which multiplies the diusion of those decisions (interview with an anonymous legis-
lator in the State Assembly of Ceara 2015).
One of the main events by which Courts' decisions are publicized take place shortly
before the elections. Three months before each election all federal, state and munici-
pal Audit Courts are required by law to provide the regional Electoral Tribunals with
a list of all present and former ocials -including candidates in the current election-
whose accounts have been denitively rejected during the previous 8 years (as they
might be subject to the ineligibility law). These lists are made public in the Audit
Courts' websites.
More importantly, the publication of these lists is a major event for all media19.
According to one Audit Court board member, it is one of the top news on the media
agenda during the publication time (interview with Ponte 2015); as another Audit
Court board members puts it: \it is part of the electoral climate" (interview with
an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara
2015). Radio stations often read out load the lists in their broadcasts, and if there is
any member of the local government in that municipality this will arguably be cov-
ered if there is a local radio run by a member of an opponent party (interview with
19Interview with an anonymous ocial of the Secretary of External Control of the Federal Audit
Court 2016, interview with Ponte 2015, interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry
of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara 2015, interview with an anonymous mayor of a municipality
in the State of Ceara 2015, interview with an anonymous board member substitute of the State of
Pernambuco Audit Court 2015.
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an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara
2015). In some states, the Audit Courts' presidents are interviewed on TV where
they explain the signicance of the list (interview with an anonymous board member
substitute of the State of Pernambuco Audit Court 2015). As one mayor from a small
municipality in the Northeast explains, \the media love those lists" (interview with
a mayor of a municipality in the State of Ceara 2015).
Media attention to those lists is in part a product of the civil society mobilization
through demonstrations and collection of signatures to promote the enactment of the
"Clean Records" law20 (interview with Pimentel 2015, interview with Massa 2015, in-
terview with Ponte 2015, interview with an anonymous ocial of the Public Ministry
of the Municipal Audit Court of Ceara 2015, interview with Pacheco 2016). The lists
of candidates with accounts rejected became popularized as the \dirty records" lists,
and candidates in that list became known as \dirty records candidates", undermining
their reputation (interview with Pacheco 2016). According to one Audit Court pros-
ecutor: \Now people pay a lot of attention to the lists of \dirty records", politicians
have much more pressure" (interview with Massa 2015).
Political campaigns are another important form of diusion, as challengers will
discredit incumbents with records of accounts rejection (interview with an anony-
mous legislator of the State Assembly of Ceara 2015) and will provide the media with
information on incumbents' negative records (interview with Ponte 2015). The accu-
sation that the mayor used a certain amount of funds for a specic project without
justication becomes part of their toolkit to attack incumbents (interview with an
anonymous legislator of the State Assembly of Ceara 2015, interview with Ponte 2015,
interview with an anonymous assistant of a city councilman in the city of Recife 2015).
20On the civil society mobilization leading to the enactment of the \Clean Records" Law see Doin
et al. (2012)
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2.5 Hypotheses
In the following sections I present results for the econometric analyzes. I test the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Candidates with accounts rejected have their share of votes reduced
and are less likely to be reelected.
Hypothesis 2: Electoral accountability is higher in municipalities where there are
local radio stations available.
Hypothesis 3: Electoral accountability decreases when the incumbent candidates with
accounts rejected have positive records of public spending.
Hypothesis 4: Candidates with accounts rejected receive fewer campaign donations.
2.6 Data
2.6.1 Treatment and Outcome Variables
The treatment is a denitive accounts rejection by any of the 34 Brazilian Audit
Courts when the ocial exhausted all possible appeals; which is prior to the City
Council vote (in the case of mayors). The total number of candidates with accounts
rejected in the mayoral elections is 611 (in the 2012 election) and 658 (in the 2008 elec-
tion). The total number of candidates for City Council with accounts rejected is 1,767
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(in the 2012 election) and 1,307 (in the 2008 election). As outcome variables I use the
percentage of valid votes and a binary variable indicating if the candidate was elected.
2.6.2 Interaction Terms
For the interaction terms on local media I use a dummy indicating whether the
municipality has at least one local radio AM, and another dummy indicating if the
municipality has at least one local radio FM. For the interaction term on public spend-
ing I use data on the total per capita spending on education, health, transportation
and housing at the municipal level from the National Secretary Treasury (Secretaria
do Tesouro Nacional). Because only incumbent mayors can claim credit for the use of
public spending, this interaction is only used in the analyses restricted to incumbent
mayors.
2.6.3 Independent Variables
The independent variables included in the models are candidate's party, state, three
dummy variables indicating if the candidate was incumbent in the 2008, 2004, or 2000
election, age, gender and education, all factors that arguably can have an impact on
electoral outcomes. An additional campaign spending variable (relative to the total
municipal spending) is included in specic models -and omitted in others-. Its inclu-
sion will be specied in each analysis. For the analysis of city councilmen I include a
dummy indicating if the candidate belongs to the same party than the elected mayor
and a dummy indicating if he or she belongs to a party that is part of the ruling
coalition.
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2.7 Methods
To estimate the eect of accounts rejection on electoral outcomes I use two dier-
ent estimators: matching with dierence-in-dierence and regression analysis. The
dierence-in-dierence provides an estimation of the dierence between \treated"
candidates (i.e. candidates with accounts rejected) and \non-treated" candidates in
the 2012 and 2008 election; that is, before and after the treatment of interest. To
match candidates along a set of covariates I use propensity score matching, which
measures the conditional probability of exposure to a treatment for the observed co-
variates (Rosenbaum 2010). While in the pre-matching analysis we expect that the
units' conditional probability of being part of the treatment or control group diers,
we match on a set of covariates to ensure that the treatment and control group will
only dier in the treatment of interest. This quasi-experimental design results in
potentially better estimates, as it compares trends in both treatment and control
groups before and after the inclusion of the treatment. This analysis uses a smaller
sample of \treated" candidates as this sample is restricted to those who had a rst
accounts rejection between 2008 and 2012 (before the election) and run in both elec-
tions. Because this sample includes only candidates with accounts rejection between
2008 and 2012 the diusion is likely to be more salient in voters' mind at the time of
the election, potentially leading to higher treatment eects.
A potential problem for the dierence-in-dierence estimate is that Audit Courts
can publicize decisions to reject accounts that could be appealed -and hence are not
denitive- over the course of various years. The entire institutional process leading
to a denitive accounts rejection takes many years. This means that prior to 2008
some voters may have learnt about Audit Courts decisions, even if those decisions
were not denitive. This institutional feature results in treatments that could be
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conceptualized as a series of \dosages"; that is, information released over the course
of various years. As a consequence, the treatment eect in the dierence-in-dierence
analysis could be underestimated (as the pre-treatment estimate would contain some
\dosage" of treatment).
For this reason I include regression analysis, which doesn't require to identify any
pre-treatment estimate (and hence could provide a better model for a treatment re-
leased over the course of the years). In addition, regression analysis can use larger
samples leading to more statistical power, as it also includes \treated" candidates with
accounts rejected prior to 2008. Regression analysis also allows to estimate both the
treatment eect for a complete sample of candidates and also for a sample restricted
to only incumbents | this restriction is not possible in the dierence-in-dierence
given the reduced sample size21. The regression analysis is also used to assess the
eect of interaction terms.
The sample used in each estimate can be summarized as follows:
Matching and dierence-in-dierence:
Sampling frame: All candidates in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
Eective sample: Those who run in both elections.
Treatment group: Those with accounts rejected between 2008 and 2012.
Control group: All others.
21While in the dierence-in-dierence all \treated" candidates had accounts rejected between
2008 and 2012, those candidates are not necessarily incumbents, as the accounts rejection might be
a product of an oce holding prior to 2008. The interaction in the regression analyses -non reported-
between incumbency and accounts rejection shows that incumbent candidates with accounts rejected
suer a stronger electoral punishment than non incumbents. The dierence is signicant in some
models, although not in all models.
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Regression analysis:
Sampling frame: All candidates in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
Eective sample: Candidates who run in 2008 and candidates who run in 2012 (the
outcome measure is in each single election). Analyses with complete sample of can-
didates and with sample of incumbents only (specied in each model).
Treatment group: Those with accounts rejected between 2004 and 2008 (in analyses
for the 2008 election) and those with accounts rejected between 2004 and 2012 (in
analyses for the 2012 election).
Control group: All others.
2.8 The Eect of Accounts Rejection on Electoral Outcomes in Elections for Mayor
2.8.1 Matching and Dierence-in-Dierence
In table 2.1 I present pre and post matching balance statistics. It shows that match-
ing signicantly improved the covariate balance in most variables, with the exception
of gender, which nonetheless still shows a relatively high p-value.
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TABLE 2.1: Pre and Post-Matching Balance between Treatment and Control Groups
Candidates for Mayor
Propensity Score Matching
Pre-Matching Post-Matching
(P-Value) (P-Value)
Candidate Spending/Municipal Spending 0.09 0.81
Incumbent (2008) 0.20 0.81
Incumbent (2004) 0.00 0.99
Incumbent (2000) 0.03 0.82
Age 0.01 0.43
Municipal Spending (2005-2008) 0.00 0.53
Male 0.72 0.33
Education University Complete 0.77 0.82
Education High School Complete 0.90 0.85
Education Primary School Complete 0.05 0.66
Education Reads and Writes 0.00 1.00
Party PMDB 0.17 0.86
Party PSDB 0.08 0.19
Party PT 0.31 0.41
State RJ 0.64 0.64
State SP 0.00 0.72
In table 2.2 I present results for the dierence-in-dierence using percentage of
valid votes as dependent variable. The estimate represents the electoral loss, in terms
of percentage points, of \treated candidates" in the 2012 election (relative to their
vote share in the 2008 election) minus the electoral dierence in vote share of the \con-
trol candidates" in the 2012 election (relative to their vote share in the 2008 election).
Results show a loss of 4.60 percentage points for candidates with accounts rejected.
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The magnitude of the dierence is relatively high, although in the context of mayoral
elections is lower than the average margin of dierence of percentage votes between
the winner and the second candidate. In the 2012 election the average percentage
of votes for winners was 55.09 % with an average dierence of 16 percentage points
with the second. In the 2008 election the average percentage of votes for winners was
56.46 % with an average dierence of 17.99 percentage points with the second. As we
can see in table 2.3, accounts rejection doesn't have a statistically signicant eect
on the likelihood of being reelected (with a sample of 119 matched candidates).
TABLE 2.2: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Vote Share
Candidates for Mayor
Propensity Score Matching
Estimate Standard Error
Accounts Rejection -4.60** 1.98
Matched Observations 119
Dierence in Dierence. Estimate measured as percentage of valid votes.
Abadie-Imbens Standard Error. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
TABLE 2.3: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Election Likelihood
Candidates for Mayor
Propensity Score Matching
Estimate Standard Error
Accounts Rejection -0.06 0.06
Matched Observations 119
Dierence in Dierence. Dependent Variable: Likelihood of Reelection.
Abadie-Imbens Standard Error. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
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2.8.2 Regression Analysis
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present various models using the samples of all candidates and
incumbents only with candidates who had accounts rejected between 2004 and 2012.
The candidate spending variable (with the campaign funds that the candidate spent
in 2012 as a share of total campaign funds spent in that municipality) was omitted in
all models as it might partially reect changes in campaign donations, which are af-
fected by the treatment (as discussed in section 2.11). The inclusion of these controls
doesn't substantively modify these results (although generates a marginal reduction
in the size of the treatment coecients). In table 2.4 I estimate the eect of accounts
rejection in reelection likelihood and vote share in the 2012 election. Model 1 in that
table shows a statistically signicant reduction in the reelection likelihood of candi-
dates for mayor. Model 2 uses the candidate's vote share as the dependent variable,
and shows a signicant loss of 3.11 percentage points. Models 3 and 4 show similar
analyses with the sample restricted to incumbents only, also showing a signicant
reduction in the likelihood of being reelected and in the percentage of valid votes.
Models 5 and 6 use an interaction between accounts rejected and existence of a local
AM radio (Model 5) or FM radio (Model 6) with the sample of all candidates. None of
these interactions are signicant, suggesting that the existence of local media doesn't
have a signicant impact on the eect of accounts rejection on electoral outcomes.
Model 7 uses an interaction between public spending and accounts rejected with the
sample restricted to incumbents. Results show no signicant interaction, suggesting
that voters don't trade public spending for transparency.
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TABLE 2.4: Eect of Account Rejection. Candidates for Mayor. 2012 Election.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Election Vote Share Reelection Vote Share Election Election Reelection
Accounts Rejected -0.49*** -3.23*** -0.70*** -3.40** -0.43** -0.49** -1.12*
(2004-2012) (0.15) (1.23) (0.21) (1.55) (0.17) (0.20) (0.70)
Municipal Spending -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incumbent 2008 0.36*** 7.93*** { { 0.33*** 0.33*** {
(0.07) (0.59) { { (0.07) (0.07) {
Incumbent 2004 -0.18 -1.07 -0.30 -7.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08
(0.15) (1.23) (0.87) (6.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.07)
Incumbent 2000 0.17 2.56** -0.07 -0.35 0.15 0.15 -0.07
(0.14) (1.09) (0.20) (1.43) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20)
Party PT -0.09 -2.36* -0.31 -4.61*** -0.13 -0.13 -0.31
(0.16) (1.27) (0.24) (1.68) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24)
Party PSDB 0.18 1.06 0.09 -1.83 0.15 0.15 0.09
(0.15) (1.24) (0.23) (1.62) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23)
Party PMDB 0.14 1.26 0.10 -1.84 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.15) (1.17) (0.21) (1.53) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21)
State SP 0.08 2.00 0.92 12.6** 0.08 0.08 0.92
(0.52) (3.90) (0.80) (5.85) (0.52) (0.52) (0.80)
State RJ -0.40 -4.20 0.72 4.44 -0.29 -0.29 0.72
(0.55) (4.27) (0.89) (6.43) (0.58) (0.58) (0.88)
Age -0.03*** -0.29*** -0.03*** -0.32*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (Male) 0.35*** 2.00** 0.52*** 3.40*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.52***
(0.11) (0.90) (0.17) (1.23) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17)
University Complete 15.0 25.9 14.7 23.0 15.1 15.1 14.7
(882.7) (16.4) (882.7) (15.2) (882.7) (882.7) (882.7)
High School Complete 15.2 25.5 14.9 24.1 15.2 15.2 14.9
(882.7) (16.6) (882.7) (15.2) (882.7) (882.7) (882.7)
Primary School 15.0 25.9 14.6 24.4 15.0 15.0 14.6
Complete (882.7) (16.7) (882.7) (15.3) (882.7) (882.7) (882.7)
Reads and Writes 15.1 29.1* 14.9 20.5 15.1 15.1 14.9
(882.7) (16.9) (882.7) (16.1) (882.7) (882.7) (882.7)
Accounts Rejected -0.28
* Radio AM (0.36)
Accounts Rejected 0.10
* Radio FM (0.30)
Accounts Rejected -0.00
* Municipal Spending (0.00)
Intercept -14.0 29.9* -13.9 35.7** -14.0 -14.0 -13.9
(882.7) (17.1) (882.7) (16.5) (882.7) (882.7) (882.7)
Incumbents Only No No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 15,013 15,013 1.939 1,939 15,013 15,013 1,939
N Accounts Rejected 611 611 134 134 611 611 134
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis
Models 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7: Logistic regression. Models 2 and 4: OLS.
All models include full state and party dummies.
Models 5 & 6 include single interaction term as control (not reported).
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In table 2.5 I present similar analyses for electoral and reelection outcomes in the
context of the 2008 election. Here, in none of the models accounts rejection shows
a signicant coecient. This suggests that contextual factors related to the 2012
elections -such as the mobilization for the enactment of the \Clean Records" law-
might have facilitated the spread of information of candidates' accounts rejection an-
tecedents.
As can be seen in models 5 and 6, the radio AM and radio FM interactions have a
positive coecient and signicant in the case of the latter. However, the coecient of
the eect of accounts rejection in municipalities with radio stations (-0.11 + 0.39 =
0.28) is not signicant, with a standard error of 0.15. The interaction of accounts re-
jection and municipal spending is negative and signicant, providing evidence against
the trade o hypothesis. In model 7 the positive sign and signicance of the accounts
rejection coecient has little substantive implications22.
22As suggested by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) this coecient should be interpreted as
conditional on the public spending interaction, and only true in the case when per capita public
spending equals 0.
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TABLE 2.5: Eect of Account Rejection. Candidates for Mayor. 2008 Election.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Election Vote Share Reelection Vote Share Election Election Reelection
Accounts Rejected 0.05 0.62 0.05 -1.69 0.03 -0.11 0.47**
(2004-2008) (0.10) (0.83) (0.19) (1.43) (0.11) (0.13) (0.23)
Municipal Spending -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incumbent 2004 1.15*** 17.5*** { { 1.51*** 1.15*** {
(0.05) (0.40) { { (0.05) (0.05) {
Incumbent 2000 0.01 6.60*** -0.40 -7.35 0.13 0.13 -0.30
(0.01) (0.71) (0.78) (6.40) (0.08) (0.08) (0.79)
Party PT -0.25*** -6.61*** 0.19 -0.87 -0.24*** -0.24*** 0.20
(0.08) (0.74) (0.20) (1.51) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20)
Party PSDB 0.14* 1.18 0.15 0.47 0.14 0.14 0.15
(0.08) (0.72) (0.18) (1.35) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18)
Party PMDB 0.13* 2.32*** -0.01 0.76 0.12 0.13 -0.01
(0.08) (0.67) (0.16) (1.27) (0.09) (0.08) (0.16)
State SP 0.05 -1.04 0.44 16.4*** 0.03 0.03 0.44
(0.32) (2.58) (0.74) (5.38) (0.30) (0.32) (0.73)
State RJ 0.02 -1.19 0.30 16.5*** 0.17 0.17 0.30
(0.35) (2.77) (0.82) (5.97) (0.35) (0.35) (0.82)
Campaign Spending 0.00** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.02*** -0.18*** -0.04*** -0.37*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (Male) 0.35*** 2.13*** 0.35** 2.51** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35**
(0.06) (0.51) (0.15) (1.15) (0.01) (0.06) (0.14)
University Complete -17.0 -11.7 0.09 -0.81 -16.9 -16.9 0.08
(240) (18.4) (0.16) (1.26) (240) (240) (0.16)
High School Complete -17.0 11.0 0.24 -0.28 -16.9 -16.9 0.24
(240) (18.4) (0.17) (1.32) (240) (240) (0.17)
Primary School -17.1 11.2 0.24 -1.22 -17.1 -17.1 0.24
Complete (240.0) (18.4) (0.20) (1.55) (240) (240) (0.20)
Reads and Writes -16.9 -11.1 0.20 -2.99 -17.0 -16.9 0.22
(240.0) (18.4) (0.41) (3.27) (240) (240) (0.41)
Accounts Rejected 0.06
* Radio AM (0.23)
Accounts Rejected 0.39**
* Radio FM (0.19)
Accounts Rejected -0.00**
* Municipal Spending (0.00)
Intercept 17.0 54.7*** 2.47*** 59.9*** 17.0 17.0 2.49***
(240) (18.6) (0.82) (5.96) (240) (240) (0.82)
Incumbents Only No No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 14,865 14,865 3,022 3,022 14,865 14,865 3,022
N Accounts Rejected 658 658 195 195 658 658 195
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis
Models 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7: Logistic regression. Models 2 and 4: OLS.
All models include full state and party dummies.
Models 5 & 6 include single interaction term as control (not reported).
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2.9 The Eect of Accounts Rejection on Electoral Outcomes in Elections for City
Council
2.9.1 Matching and Dierence-in-Dierence
In this section I consider the eect of accounts rejection on electoral outcomes for
the sample of candidates for City Council. Table 2.6 shows the propensity score of
being in the treatment group given the set of covariates. Propensity score matching
provides good balance in all variables, and in all cases the p-value increases after
matching, with the exception of the rst category of education (reads and writes)
which nonetheless still has a high p-value. This ensures the \as if random" condi-
tion, there is equal probability for a candidate of being in the control group or in the
treatment group given this set of covariates.
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TABLE 2.6: Pre and Post-Matching Balance between Treatment and Control Groups
Candidates for City Council
Propensity Score Matching
Pre-Matching Post-Matching
(P-Value) (P-Value)
Spending 0.00 0.51
Incumbent (2008) 0.00 0.62
Incumbent (2004) 0.00 0.32
Incumbent (2000) 0.00 0.98
Age 0.00 0.67
Party Mayor 0.00 0.88
Coalition Mayor 0.00 0.84
Male 0.00 0.57
Education University Complete 0.00 0.24
Education High School Complete 0.07 0.93
Education Primary School Complete 0.00 0.96
Education Reads and Writes 0.76 0.63
Party PMDB 0.75 0.99
Party PSDB 0.00 0.90
Party PT 0.00 0.64
State RJ 0.50 0.97
State SP 0.00 0.71
In Table 2.7 I present the results of the dierence-in-dierence. Results show
a decrease in electoral returns of candidates with accounts rejected of 0.73 percentage
points, and it is statistically signicant (at the 0.01 level, two tailed test). In the con-
text of highly competitive elections, this apparently small dierence might be crucial.
The average percentage of votes received by winning candidates in the 2012 election
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was 4.74%, while the average percentage of votes received by the non winning candi-
dates who received the highest percentage of votes in each municipality is 3.99%. The
average dierence between winners and candidates who lost for the smallest margin
is 0.75 percentage points. In the case of the 2008 election, the average percentage
of votes for the winner is 4.90%, while the average percentage of votes received by
the non winning candidates with the highest share of votes in each municipality is
4.20%. The average margin of victory was 0.7 percentage points. The loss of votes
that can be attributed to the accounts rejection could make the dierence between
being elected or not.
Table 2.8 uses likelihood to be elected as the dependent variable. Results also
show a signicant decrease in the likelihood of being elected for the candidates with
accounts rejected.
.
TABLE 2.7: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Vote Share
City Councilmen
Propensity Score Matching
Estimate Standard Error
Accounts Rejection -0.73*** 0.10
Matched Observations 458
Dierence in Dierence. Estimate measured as percentage of valid votes.
Abadie-Imbens Standard Error. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 2.8: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Election Likelihood
City Councilmen.
Propensity Score Matching
Estimate Standard Error
Accounts Rejection -0.09*** 0.02
Matched Observations 458
Dierence in Dierence. Estimate measured as percentage of valid votes.
Abadie-Imbens Standard Error. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
2.9.2 Regression Analysis
In table 2.9 I present results of various models using OLS and logistic regression
testing the eect of accounts rejection on the electoral outcomes in the 2012 election.
In these analyses I exclude the variable candidate spending in the 2012 election to
avoid introducing bias, since candidates with accounts rejected receive signicantly
fewer funds in this election (see results in section 2.11). The inclusion of this control
doesn't introduce any signicant changes in the results (beyond a marginal reduction
in the size of the coecients). Results show in the 7 models a signicant reduction in
the likelihood of being reelected and in the percentage of valid votes for candidates
with accounts rejected. In models 5 and 6 the radio AM and FM interactions show
no signicant eect of accounts rejection on electoral outcomes.
40
TABLE 2.9: Eect of Accounts Rejection. 2012 Election. Candidates for City Council.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Election Vote Share Reelection Vote Share Election Election
Accounts Rejected -0.65*** -0.63*** -0.78*** -0.87*** -0.66*** -0.59***
(2004-2012) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Party Mayor 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.04 -0.01 0.06** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Coalition Mayor 0.30*** 0.77 -0.03 0.84*** -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Incumbent 2008 1.22*** 1.30*** { { 1.23*** 1.23***
(0.02) (0.01) { { (0.02) (0.02)
Incumbent 2004 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.67*** 0.67***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Incumbent 2000 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Party PT -0.05 -0.17*** -0.09 -0.37*** -0.10** -0.10**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Party PSDB 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Party PMDB 0.13 0.10*** 0.03 0.11** 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
State SP 0.12 -0.09 0.37* 0.27 0.13 0.15
(0.13) (0.07) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
State RJ 0.02 -0.29*** 0.42* -0.12 0.03 0.05
(0.14) (0.08) (0.23) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15)
Age -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (Male) 0.82*** 0.57*** 0.28*** 0.02 0.81*** 0.81***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
University Complete 0.21 0.11 0.53 -0.14 10.50 10.50
(0.64) (0.30) (1.05) (0.85) (81.93) (81.86)
High School Complete 0.02 0.25 0.41 0.26 10.32 10.31
(0.64) (0.30) (1.06) (0.85) (81.93) (81.87)
Primary School Complete -0.02 0.36 0.40 0.51 10.29 10.28
(0.64) (0.30) (1.06) (0.85) (81.93) (81.87)
Reads and Writes -0.20 0.25 0.36 0.48 10.15 10.14
(0.64) (0.31) (1.06) (0.85) (81.93) (81.87)
Accounts Rejected 0.11
* Radio AM (0.19)
Accounts Rejected -0.10
* Radio FM (0.16)
Intercept -1.74*** 1.09*** 0.07 4.03*** -12.07 -12.09
(0.66) (0.32) (1.08) (0.88) (81.93) (81.87)
Incumbents Only No No Yes Yes No No
N 420,555 420,555 36,727 36,727 420,577 420,577
N Accounts Rejected 1,767 1,767 671 671 1,767 1,767
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis
Models 1, 3, 5, and 6: Logistic regression. Models 2 and 4: OLS.
All models include full state and party dummies.
Models 5 & 6 include single interaction term as control (not reported).
In table 2.10 I use similar models for the 2008 City Council elections with the
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inclusion of the candidate spending variable. Results show a negative and signicant
eect of accounts rejection on electoral outcomes in all models except for models 3
(only signicant at the .1 level) and 4, which are the models including incumbents
only. Models 5 and 6 show a positive and signicant interaction between both radio
AM and FM and accounts rejection. Consequently, the signicant and negative co-
ecients in the accounts rejected variable (i.e. -0.46 and -0.62) represent a decrease
in the likelihood of reelection for candidates with accounts rejected in municipalities
without an AM or FM radio respectively. In municipalities with radio AM or FM
the size of the coecient is close to zero in both cases (0.02 in model 5 and 0.03 in
model 6) and non signicant (as the size of the standard errors is 0.18 in the rst case
and 0.14 in the second case). This suggests that electoral punishment is stronger in
municipalities where there is no local media, which contradicts prior studies.
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TABLE 2.10: Eect of Accounts Reelection. 2008 Election. Candidates for City Council.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Election Vote Share Reelection Vote Share Election Election
Accounts Rejected -0.31*** -0.18** -0.24* -0.17 -0.46*** -0.62***
(2004-2008) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Party Mayor 0.15 0.26** 0.19 0.39*** 0.19 0.19
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Coalition Mayor 0.46*** 1.27*** 0.36 1.21*** 0.38** 0.37**
(0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Incumbent 2004 0.65*** 0.93*** { { 0.61*** 0.62***
(0.09) (0.08) { { (0.10) (0.10)
Incumbent 2000 0.50*** 0.59*** 0.48*** 0.65*** 0.56*** 0.56***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Party PT -0.44 -0.62*** -0.20 -0.59* -0.37 -0.35
(0.24) (0.22) (0.31) (0.30) (0.26) (0.25)
Party PSDB -0.14 -0.12 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
(0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18)
Party PMDB -0.09 -0.10 0.01 -0.20 -0.03 -0.04
(0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
State SP -0.74 -1.25 -0.19 -1.05 -0.62 -0.67
(0.58) (0.53) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64)
State RJ -0.90 -1.26 -0.25 -1.03 -0.70 -0.78
(0.61) (0.57) (0.70) (0.69) (0.68) (0.67)
Campaign Spending 8.30*** 12.0*** 4.87*** 8.95*** 8.15*** 8.14***
(1.12) (0.88) (1.12) (1.01) (1.18) (1.18)
Age -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender (Male) 0.46*** 0.19 0.37** -0.14 0.53*** 0.53***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
University Complete 13.5 0.14 -0.21 -0.64*** 13.3 13.3
(882.7) (2.04) (0.18) (0.18) (882.7) (882.7)
High School Complete 13.6 0.53 -0.04 -0.21 13.5 13.5
(882.7) (2.04) (0.16) (0.16) (882.7) (882.7)
Primary School Complete 13.5 0.49 0.06 0.13 13.3 13.3
(882.7) (2.04) (0.18) (0.18) (882.7) (882.7)
Reads and Writes 13.4 0.65 0.00 0.37 13.3 13.3
(882.7) (2.05) (0.33) (0.32) (882.7) (882.7)
Accounts Rejected 0.48**
* Radio AM (0.20)
Accounts Rejected 0.65***
* Radio FM (0.18)
Intercept -12.1 5.13** 1.80*** 7.37*** -12.1 -12.0
(882.7) (2.12) (0.75) (0.73) (882.7) (882.7)
Incumbents Only No No Yes Yes No No
N 321,137 321,137 37,136 37,136 321,137 321,137
N Accounts Rejected 1,307 1,307 710 710 1,307 1,307
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis
Models 1, 3, 5, and 6: Logistic regression. Models 2 and 4: OLS.
All models include full state and party dummies.
Models 5 & 6 include single interaction term as control (not reported).
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2.10 The Eect of Accounts Rejection on Decision to Re-list
Candidates receiving negative audits from the Audit Courts might be less likely to
run for reelection. In the case of this study, the risk of selection bias is two-fold. First,
candidates with accounts rejected might decide not to run for reelection to avoid an
electoral punishment. Second, as previously explained, candidates with accounts re-
jected might want to run for reelection but might become ineligible after attempting
to launch their candidacy. If either of these selection biases exists, the estimate could
underestimate the true causal eect, as candidates receiving negative reports would
not run.
To assess the possibility of selection bias I run various models, displayed in ap-
pendix A. Table A.2.1 displays two models on likelihood to relist with the sample
of candidates for mayor in the 2012 election who run in the 2008 election and had
accounts rejected between 2008 and 2012 (i.e. the sample used in the matching and
dierence-in-dierence estimation). In model 1 I assess whether candidates with ac-
counts rejected are less likely to run for oce. This might be a source of bias insofar
as candidates who attempt to re-run have advantages over the ones that chose not
to re-list, such as a more stable electorate based on the use of clientelistic networks,
or better relations with the local media. The dependent variable in this model is a
dummy indicating if the candidate re-listed in the 2012 election. I include as covari-
ates the share of votes received in the prior election, the share of candidate spending
(relative to the total spending in the municipality) in the prior election, age, gen-
der and education. Note that in this model I am assessing whether candidates with
accounts rejection are willing to run for reelection regardless whether the Electoral
Tribunal nally decided that the candidate was ineligible. Results show that can-
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didates with accounts rejected are less likely to attempt to re-list for re-election in
the subsequent election. In table A.2.2 model 1 I display an analogous model for
candidates for City Council.
Another issue of concern is if candidates with more oenses are less likely to re-list
than candidates with minor oenses. Candidates might have dierent open processes
in the Audit Courts, and might be condemned in more than one process. In model 2
(tables A.2.1 and A.2.2) I consider a sample restricted to candidates who had their
accounts rejected between 2008 and 2012 to test if candidates with more processes of
accounts rejection are less likely to re-list. Results, still signicant, show that those
candidates are less likely to re-list both for candidates for mayor and candidates for
City Council.
In model 3 (table A.2.2) I test whether candidates with more accounts rejected
are more likely to have their candidacy banned by the Electoral Tribunal when they
attempted to re-list. Results again show that candidates with more episodes of ac-
counts rejection are more likely to be banned by the Electoral Tribunal. This model
is displayed only for candidates for City Council, as there are no formally registered
candidates for mayor with accounts rejected between 2008 and 2012 attempting to
relist and banned by the Superior Electoral Tribunal.
The present discussion holds for the models considering only incumbents running
for reelection (in tables 2.4-2.5 and 2.9-2.10) and for the matching and dierence-in-
dierence analyses (which consider only candidates who run in the 2008 and 2012
election). In those cases, results could be underestimating the real treatment eect.23
For the samples with all candidates this interpretation doesn't necessarily hold, as
these samples include both candidates who run -and won or were defeated- in the
23An alternative interpretation, following De Magalhaes (2015), is that the estimate shows the
unconditional eect of accounts rejection on likelihood of reelection, taking the value of 1 if the
candidate decides to re-run and wins the election, and 0 if either he loses or decides not to re-run.
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prior election as well as candidates who didn't, a portion of which had accounts re-
jection for any prior oce holding or for any prior responsibility in the use of public
funds.
The selection bias identied in those models might be underestimating the true
treatment eect, as candidates with accounts rejected who arguably would lose votes
and would be less likely to be re-elected decide not to re-run. A Heckman selection
model could overcome this bias and provide a better estimation of the true eect. A
Heckman model depends on the inclusion of an instrument with a signicant eect
on the outcome variable in the selection model (i.e. likelihood to re-run) but not on
the outcome variable in the outcome model (i.e. likelihood to be re-elected). There
is one variable that could respond to this condition: the timing of the Audit Court
decision. An empirical test shows that when the Audit Court decision is closer to
the election, candidates with accounts rejected are more likely to re-run; and timing
of decision doesn't aect electoral outcomes. However, running a Heckman selection
model was not possible due to collinearity between the instrument and the treatment.
2.11 Eect of Accounts Rejection on Campaign Donations
Prior work suggests an elite based mechanism of accountability, as candidates facing
corruption accusations can receive fewer campaign donations, which is likely to have
an impact on the electoral outcomes (Pereira, Renno & Samuels 2011). In table 2.11
I present results using as dependent variable the percentage of campaign donations
that candidates received (relative to total donations in their municipality) for both
candidates for mayor and city councilman in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
Results show that only in the 2012 election there was a signicant negative impact
of accounts rejection on the percentage of campaign donations received by the candi-
46
date, although in the case of the city councilmen the magnitude of the coecient is
relatively small.
TABLE 2.11: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Campaign Donations. Elections 2008 and 2012
All Candidates for Mayor and City Councilman
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mayor Mayor City Council City Council
2012 2008 2012 2008
Accounts Rejected -7.08*** 0.05 -0.22*** -0.31
(1.67) (1.19) (0.08) (0.19)
Incumbent 2008 14.78*** { 2.05*** {
(0.83) { (0.20) {
Incumbent 2004 0.01 15.32*** 0.71*** 1.15***
(1.72) (0.60) (0.02) (0.20)
Incumbent 2000 5.58*** 8.27*** 0.33*** 0.36*
(1.52) (1.06) (0.02) (0.18)
Party PT -4.03** -6.54*** 0.09** 0.36
(1.76) (1.09) (0.04) 0.49
Party PSDB 0.25 1.16 0.11*** 0.81**
(1.72) (1.07) (0.04) (0.36)
Party PMDB -1.51 2.32** 0.20*** 0.48
(1.63) (1.00) (0.04) (0.35)
State SP 2.44 -0.72 -0.07 -0.99
(5.54) (3.60) (0.12) (1.21)
State RJ 1.02 -2.88 -0.31** -0.38
(6.04) (3.90) (0.12) (1.27)
Age -0.26*** -0.14*** -0.01*** -0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Gender (Male) -0.99 -0.58 0.51*** -0.11
(1.25) (0.75) (0.01) (0.29)
Education (University Complete) -7.27 2.49 1.01** -0.43
(24.24) (28.42) (0.50) (0.57)
Education (High School Complete) -7.78 3.49 0.74 -0.54
(24.25) (28.42) (0.50) (4.57)
Education (Primary School Complete) -5.57 3.02 0.69 -0.87
(24.28) (28.43) (0.51) (4.57)
Education (Reads and Writes) -0.65 2.70 0.63 -0.67
(24.64) (28.51) (0.51) (4.59)
Intercept 57.13** 40.91 0.34 4.17
(24.98) (28.68) (0.52) (4.76)
N 15,013 14,865 420,555 321,137
N Accounts Rejected 611 658 1,767 1,307
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis.
All models include full state and party dummies.
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2.12 Discussion
Results presented in this study suggest that both candidates for mayor and for city
councilman with accounts rejected receive an electoral punishment. Even in elections
for relatively less salient oces, such as City Council legislator, at least a portion
of the electorate is informed about the negative audits and responds by supporting
an alternative candidate. This suggests that the selection mechanism is eective in
sub-national elections. When electoral systems promote highly competitive elections
-such as the elections for city councilman- even a small reduction in the share of votes
could make the dierence between being elected or not.
Besides voters' punishment, there are other selection mechanisms that play a sig-
nicant role. First, candidates with negative audits often opt not to re-run in the
next election. These candidates might be anticipating electoral losses or they might
desist because of restrictions in the electoral laws. In either of these cases, the result
is a better quality of representatives in local politics. Second, donors often decide not
to support these candidates, which also contributes to the selection mechanism.
In addition, the diusion of the candidates' negative records by the Audit Courts,
the media, and by other candidates during the campaigns also contributes to this
selection mechanism. The spread of information reinforces all other mechanisms of
electoral accountability. First, it increases voters' awareness and their electoral pun-
ishment. Second, donors might also be inuenced by this diusion, either because
they are less willing to support candidates with negative records, or because they
assume that these candidates have fewer chances in the electoral game. Third, the
diusion might create pressure for candidates to retire from the electoral game, as
they perceive that voters are aware of their oenses.
Results also show weak evidence for other factors listed as relevant in prior litera-
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ture, such as the availability of local media, and incumbents' public spending. In the
case of the former, the existence of local radios doesn't increase electoral punishment.
Voters do not depend on those radios to receive information, which contradicts prior
scholarship. The analyses also show week support for the trade o hypothesis. Vot-
ers are not willing to condone incumbents with accounts rejected even if they show
positive records of public spending.
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Appendix A: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Likelihood to Relist
TABLE A.2.1: Eect of Accounts Rejection on the Possibilities of Re-listing for Reelection
Candidates for Mayor
Model 1 Model 2
Coecient Coecient
(Std Error) (Std Error)
Accounts Rejected -0.80*** -0.31***
(0.10) (0.11)
Vote share (2008) 0.04*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.01)
Spending -0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.02*** -0.02
(0.00) (0.01)
Gender (Male) 0.07 0.30
(0.06) (0.33)
University Complete -10.47 0.97
(11.95) (0.47)
High School Complete -10.58 0.64
(11.95) (0.48)
Primary School Complete -10.86 {
(11.95) {
Reads and Writes -10.90 -14.01
(11.95) (664.52)
N 12,820 697
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
Model 1: Eect of account rejection on possibility of relisting for all candidates.
Model 2: Eect of number of processes of account rejection on possibility of re-listing.
Only candidates with accounts rejected.
Only candidates with accounts rejected.
Female is the baseline category for gender in the three models.
Illiterate is the baseline category in models 1 and 2.
Primary Complete is the baseline category for model 2 (there are no illiterates in this sample).
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TABLE A.2.2: Eect of Accounts Rejection on the Possibilities of Re-listing for Reelection
Candidates for City Council
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coecient Coecient Coecient
(Std Error) (Std Error) (Std Error)
Accounts Rejected -1.14*** -0.38*** -0.56***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.17)
Party Mayor 0.16*** 0.34** -0.10
(0.01) (0.15) (0.24)
Coalition Mayor -0.40*** -0.01 -0.15
(0.02) (0.15) (0.27)
Vote share (2008) 38.22*** 4.88* 7.11
(0.26) (2.52) (5.14)
Spending -2.72*** 1.14 0.59
(0.16) (1.22) (2.08)
Age 0.00 0.01 0.03***
(0.16) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender (Male) 0.14*** 0.14 0.14
(0.01) (0.18) (0.33)
Education (University Complete) 0.34** 12.5 -0.31
(0.16) (324.7) (0.36)
Education (University Incomplete) 0.33** 12.3 0.15
(0.16) (324.7) (0.5)
Education (High School Complete) 0.45*** 12.3 -0.03
(0.16) (324.7) 0.34
Education (High School Incomplete) 0.42** 12.3 -0.68
(0.16) (324.7) (0.54)
Education (Primary School Complete) 0.42*** 12.12
(0.16) (324.7)
Education (Primary School Incomplete) 0.34** 12.24 -0.53
(0.16) (324.7) (0.38)
Education (Reads and Writes) 0.17 12.42 -1.23
(0.16) (324.7) (0.63)
N 321,137 1,572 510
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test).
Model 1: Eect of account rejection on possibility of relisting for all candidates.
Model 2: Eect of number of processes of account rejection on possibility of re-listing.
Only candidates with accounts rejected.
Model 3: Eect of number of processes of account rejection on possibility of being eligible.
Only candidates with accounts rejected.
Female is the baseline category for gender in the three models.
Illiterate is the baseline category in models 1 and 2.
Primary Complete is the baseline category for model 3 (there are no illiterates in this sample).
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Appendix B: Models Without Controls
TABLE B.2.1: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Electoral Outcomes. Incumbent Mayors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Election Vote Share Election Vote Share
2012 2012 2008 2008
Accounts Rejected -0.79*** -4.07*** -0.22 -3.57**
(0.18) (1.44) (0.15) (1.28)
Intercept 0.34 50.81 0.78*** 53.5***
(0.04) (0.38) (0.04) (0.33)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis.
TABLE B.2.2: Eect of Accounts Rejection on Electoral Outcomes. Incumbent City Councilmen
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Election Vote Share Election Vote Share
2012 2012 2008 2008
Accounts Rejected -0.92*** -0.95*** -0.22 -3.57**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.15) (1.28)
Intercept -1.85*** 1.32*** 0.78*** 53.5***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.33)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (two-tailed test). Standard errors in parenthesis.
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3. Public Costs, Morality and Private Gain: Assessing the Eect of Al-
ternative Information Treatments on Electoral Accountability
Abstract
Are voters' attitudes towards corrupt candidates aected by the details they learn
about candidates' wrongdoing? This study examines the eect that including dif-
ferent types of details about the public costs, illicit enrichment and other forms of
moral misbehavior by a corrupt incumbent mayor has on the probability of support
for his re-election. Three surveys experiments, using an online convenience sample of
Brazilian subjects, are used to test this question. Subjects are shown either a \limited
information" vignette with the most basic information on those records, or one of sev-
eral \extended information" vignettes which provide more details. The study presents
a threefold categorization of treatments with information that emphasizes the public
costs of corruption, the candidate's lack of honesty, and the mayor's illicit enrich-
ment. In addition, I include alternative \extended information" treatments to test
rival hypotheses. Results consistently show that information showing the mayor's il-
licit enrichment drives a stronger negative response than every alternative treatment.
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years there have been a growing number of studies investigating the condi-
tions that aect voters' reactions towards corrupt candidates. This has been the focus
of many experimental and observational studies, including an initiative to support
eld experiments across various developing countries24. These studies have empha-
sized the importance of a host of mediators, such as subjects' identication with the
accused candidate's party (Andiuza et al. 2013), subject's identication with the can-
didate's position on specic issues (Rundquist, Strom & Peters, 1977), the degree of
party system polarization (Eggers 2014), the politician's public expenditures records
(Pereira & Melo 2015, Weitz-Shapiro & Winters 2013), the overall state of the econ-
omy (Klasnja & Tucker 2013), and the role of information provided by the media and
oversight agencies (Ferraz & Finan 2008, Chang, Golden & Hill 2010, Weitz-Shapiro
& Winters 2013, Costas-Perez, Sole-Olle & Sorribas-Navarro 2012, Palau & Davesa
2013, Botero et al. 2015, Weitz-Shapiro & Winters 2015a). Most of these studies have
found consistent evidence that all else being equal, voters will reject corrupt candi-
dates. However, we know little about whether additional information on the same
corruption incident can generate a stronger rejection. Plausibly, the kind of infor-
mation that spurs a stronger reaction will depend on the kind of motivation driving
the rejection of corrupt candidates. Voters' reaction can be driven by a variety of
motivations, such as an utilitarian costs assessment of the corruption incident or a
rejection of the candidate on moral grounds.
This is the rst study, to the author's knowledge, that introduces a variety of ma-
nipulations on the information that subjects learn about a corruption incident and
24EGAP Metaketa Initiative on Political Accountability in the Developing World. More informa-
tion available at: http://egap.org/metaketa/metaketa-information-and-accountability
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tests their eect on subsequent support for the politician responsible for that inci-
dent. In particular, the study uses dierent versions of a similar vignette presenting
a corrupt mayor running for reelection. The vignettes include manipulations to the
information that subjects receive about the source of misappropriated funds, the des-
tination of those funds and about other forms of dishonest behavior by the candidate.
I introduce these variations to inquire whether subjects are sensitive to information
emphasizing the public costs of corruption, the candidate's moral misbehavior, and
his illicit enrichment.
The study was conducted using three online survey experiments presented to a con-
venience sample of Brazilian subjects. The pre-analysis plan for the second and third
experiments were pre-registered (Avenburg 2015, Avenburg 2016). All hypotheses
and analyses were included in the pre-registration except for analyses and hypotheses
of experiment #1 (which was not pre-registered). In all experiments, I use vignettes
presenting a ctitious incumbent mayor running for reelection with accounts rejected
by an Audit Court. A baseline (\limited information") vignette presents only basic
information on the Court's decision. I use alternative \extended information" vi-
gnettes with dierent pieces of additional information to test several theories on the
factors that increase rejection for a corrupt candidate. Results consistently show that
additional information showing the private spoils of corruption generate a stronger
negative response. The alternative \extended information" vignettes (including those
that emphasize the public costs of corruption) show signicant additive eects with
respect to the baseline vignette only in some cases. As such, results in this respect
are less conclusive.
These ndings suggest that corruption is not an undierentiated treatment. What
citizens thinks about a politician's behavior is largely a function of what sort of details
are revealed (generally through the media) about that behavior. More specically,
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when they learn details about how a corruption scheme is used for the politician's
personal benet their rejection of that candidate will be stronger.
The ndings have important implications for both the scholarly literature and
for assessments of the eect of corruption on public opinion at large. Regarding
the former, it provides new evidence on the specic type of motivation that spurs a
stronger response towards corrupt candidates. Citizens rejection is not prompted by
an estimation of the possible consequences of corruption on their wellbeing. They
reject the politician's ambition to use the public oce for personal gain. However,
this rejection cannot be extended to other spheres of immoral behavior (such as using
lies to conceal a malfeasance).
In terms of the implications for assessments of the impact of corruption scandals
on public opinion, these results imply that corruption news articles focusing on as-
pects such as illicit enrichment by politicians will generate a stronger public reaction
than articles covering other aspects of corruption. In addition, evidence showing that
more detailed information drive stronger responses suggests that the eect of anti-
corruption campaigns may be limited when the information they spread is limited.
This type of campaign has been carried out recently in places like Brazil and India
as part of anti-corruption non-governmental organizations grass-root campaigns.25
3.2 Assessing Costs or Judging Morality?
What kind of information about a corruption incident spurs a stronger rejection
25In Brazil both the Movement to Fight Against Electoral Corruption (Movimento Contra a Cor-
rupc~ao Eleitoral) and Brazilian Magistrates Association (Associac~ao dos Magistrados Brasileiros)
have recently published a \Dirty List" of candidates with a variety of negative records (such as cor-
ruption convictions or accounts rejected by Audit Courts). In India the Association for Democratic
Reforms carried out a similar campaign. Those lists typically present very limited or no details on
the specic accusation aecting each candidate.
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towards politicians responsible for such malfeasance? Plausibly, how voters react de-
pends on the type of judgment they invoke to evaluate politicians' behavior. Their
judgment might rely on a variety of grounds. One possibility is that voters rely on an
estimation of the costs of malfeasance. As the \trade o" hypothesis posits, voters
will condone corrupt candidates if they perceive that despite corruption politicians
have good records of social provision (Winters & Weitz Shapiro 2013). Prior scholarly
work testing the \trade o" hypothesis provided mixed empirical support, as some
studies have found no empirical evidence supporting this theory (Winters & Weitz
Shapiro 2013), others have found empirical evidence only in some contexts (Kasnja
and Tucker 2013) and others did found suggestive evidence (Pereira & Melo 2015).
Alternatively, voters might rely on a moral judgment of the candidate. Various stud-
ies show that a candidate's traits, such as integrity and trustworthiness, have an
important impact on voters' evaluation (Funk 1996, Fridkin & Kenney 2011).
These dierent grounds for judgment pertain to dierent conceptions of ethics.
According to the deontological conception, there are ethical rules that dene the
morality of an action, regardless of its anticipated consequences. These ethical rules
should be weighed by the intent of the actor. In contrast, the consequentionalist
conception considers that the morality of an actions should be weighed based on the
anticipated costs and benets of such action. This distinction has been the focus of
various experimental papers, which examine whether in dilemmatic situations sub-
jects' moral psychology is consistent with either of the two(see Ditto and Liu 2012
and Ditto and Liu 2011 for a summary). In this study, I present subjects with scenar-
ios that do not provide moral dilemmas, but rather alternative moral psychological
foundations to punish corrupt candidates.
I propose three alternative hypotheses assessing the moral psychology that grounds
voters rejection of corrupt candidates: a) voters can rely on an evaluation of the costs
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of the corruption incident |i.e. how corruption will aect their wellbeing; b) they
might ground their rejection on a moral judgment of the politician's misbehavior,
assessing equally any type of moral oense associated with the incident |e.g. using
lies to conceal the malfeasance or diverting the funds for private enrichment; c) they
might specically reject the politician's illicit enrichment.
The rst hypothesis holds that voters reject corrupt candidates based on the an-
ticipated costs of corruption on their wellbeing; that is, they rely on a consequentional
conception of ethics. When ocials misappropriate public funds, programs and ex-
penditures are defunded as a result. Consequently, the social programs and public
goods voters expect to receive will suer from this misappropriation. This might also
determine dierent individual reactions to the same treatment. For example, sub-
jects who regularly benet from public programs and expenditures may punish the
candidate more strongly, as they expect to be particularly aected by the corruption
incident.
This theory has some similarities with the \trade o" hypothesis, which holds
that voters are willing to tolerate the negative impact of corruption as long as the
candidate shows overall good records of public goods provision (Winters & Weitz
Shapiro 2013, Pereira & Melo 2015). The two dier in that the \trade o" hypoth-
esis assumes that other goods are distributed to compensate corruption, while the
consequentionalist ethics assumes that corruption will be more punished when there
is a tangible negative outcome for a specic corruption incident |i.e. regardless of
the overall performance of the politicians. The intuition that voters assess corrupt
candidates with a consequentionalist ethics is behind the message used by Banerjee
et al (2010: 20) to prime subjects on corruption: \Corrupt politicians steal money
set aside for development funds and do nothing for you".
A second theory holds that voters rejection is based on a negative moral judgment
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of the candidate's integrity, regardless of the consequences of the corrupt behavior.
Following a deontological moral conception, voters would be punishing the intent, not
the consequences, of a candidate's wrongdoing. Candidates facing corruption accu-
sations show lack of integrity, which has a negative impact on subjects' evaluation.
If voters' rejection is based on a deontological conception of ethics, when any type
of additional information on the moral misbehavior associated with the corruption
incident is included, such as using corruption for illegal enrichment, or using lies to
cover up any misuse of public funds, voters' negative reaction will increase.
A third theory holds that voters' rejection may be based on a moral judgment
that specically rejects the candidate's intent to use the public oce for personal
gain. If this is true, then voters will be particularly sensitive to any additional in-
formation showing that the candidate is using this oce for illegal enrichment. This
could be considered a specic type of deontological ethics, as voters weigh the moral
integrity of the candidate regardless of the consequences of his action. However, vot-
ers are specically sensitive to information on the illegal enrichment of the candidate
as compared to other forms of misbehavior, such as lying to conceal his wrongdoing.
The three main hypotheses of this study can be summarized as follows:
Public Costs/Consequentionalist Morality (Hypothesis 1): Voters' rejection for a cor-
rupt candidate will increase as they learn additional details about the source of the
misappropriated funds and about the costs of such misappropriation.
Hypothesis 1.1: This rejection will be stronger among subjects who regularly
benet from the programs and expenditures that were misappropriated.
Deontological Morality (Hypothesis 2): Voters' rejection for a corrupt candidate will
63
increase as they learn additional details emphasizing any kind of moral misbehavior
associated with the corruption incident (e.g. lying to conceal the incident or using
those funds for illegal personal gain).
Private Benet (Hypothesis 3): Voters' rejection for a corrupt candidate will increase
as they learn additional details specically emphasizing the use of funds for illegal
personal gain.
3.3 Costs, Benets and Morality in Corruption Treatments
In the three experiments I present alternative versions of a vignette featuring a hy-
pothetical incumbent mayor running for reelection. A \limited information" vignette
informs subjects of the corruption incident without further details; various \extended
information" vignettes include more details on the incident. In particular, the various
\extended information" vignettes present additional information about which specic
program or expenditure was used to divert funds, where funds were diverted, and
whether the candidate tried to conceal such misuse with lies. The additional infor-
mation on the source of misappropriated funds -i.e. which expenditure was aected-
is used to emphasize the costs of the corruption incident. When informed about the
source of misappropriated funds, subjects learn additional details on which particular
program is aected and hence can assess what will be the anticipated costs of this
incident. In addition, in study # 3, I introduce a vignette that makes explicit the
costs of the incident. In contrast, when subjects learn additional details on where
those funds are destined, they learn who is beneting from the corruption. The lying
treatment is included by informing the subjects that the candidate used lies to con-
ceal a malfeasance in a typical procedure of horizontal accountability. I use additional
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\extended information" vignettes to test various rival hypothesis.
To introduce these vignettes I use formats typical of news articles drawn from
existing Brazilian journals. A stylized version of an article covering a corruption case
involving local ocials includes either information on the source of the misappropri-
ated funds or information on the destination of those funds (or information on both).
Appendix K presents a number of summarized news pieces on corruption in Brazilian
municipalities used to create the experimental vignettes with a realistic format.26
A number of examples of recent scandals in Brazil -among the most prominent
ones in Brazilian history- might be useful to illustrate how information on the source
and destination of misappropriated funds conveys information on the public costs
and private benets in corruption schemes. In 2005- 2006 two major scandals hit
Brazilian politics: the Mensal~ao (\Monthly Payments") case and the Sanguessugas
(\Bloodsuckers") case. The rst was a scheme in which various members of the PT
government oered monthly bribes to allied legislators in exchange for political sup-
port. Evidence showing that legislators were receiving monthly bribes is an example
of information on the private benet of corruption; subsequently, the press reported
that the diverted funds might have originated from state owned companies' advertise-
ment budget. This is an example of the public costs of corruption. The Sanguessugas
case involved a scheme of overpayments and money diversion in public purchases of
ambulances; hence, news stories focusing on overpayments and payments without ac-
quisition of those ambulances show the public costs of such fraud.
A number of prior experimental studies have provided subjects with information
either on the source of misappropriated funds or on the destination of those funds.
For instance, Chong et al. (2015) in a eld experiment distribute leaets informing
26These examples are drawn from a non random sample and cannot be used to infer any systematic
pattern of news format from a larger population.
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citizens of the amount of funds that mayors spent in a corrupt manner and their re-
sponsibility in terms of public goods provision, which suggests the costs of a corrupt
administration27. Other experimental treatments include information on the politi-
cian's illicit enrichment (Botero et al. 2015) or information on bribe-taking, which
also emphasizes the \private benet" of corruption (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013,
Klasnja and Tucker 2013, Banerjee, Green, McManus, Pande 2012, Weitz-Shapiro &
Winters 2015a, 2015b). However, the present study is the rst to manipulate various
versions of this information in a single project to assess the eect of emphasizing the
public costs and private benets of the corruption incident on subjects' responses.
3.4 First Study
3.4.1 Experimental Design
Following Samuels & Zucco (2012), I recruited subjects online with Facebook ad-
vertisements. The ads targeted Brazilian users over the age of 18, oering the chance
to win an iPad after completing a survey. Following Samuels & Zucco's approach, in
order to attract a wider sample of subjects, I did not include any reference to politics
in the advertisement. Participants clicking on the ad were redirected to an external
website that presented the consent form and hosted the survey.
All vignettes presented a ctitious incumbent mayor, not identied by name, who
is running for reelection. Following Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2015a, 2015b), I asked
27More generally, Audit Court decisions will typically provide information that emphasizes public
costs, as they rule on whether there was a proper use of public funds. Their ruling often informs on
the type of expenditure that has been mismanaged. For instance, Ferraz and Finan (2008: 710-11) in
their study on electoral punishment towards candidates with negative audits provide the illustrative
examples of mismanagement in funds spent for infrastructure and health related programs.
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subjects to imagine they live in a dierent municipality where this mayor is running
for reelection, and informed them that since he has been in oce, the overall condi-
tions in the municipality improved, with new public works completed and improved
street cleaning. Because I am interested in comparing evaluation across dierent can-
didates who have corruption records, I used positive information on prior records,
aside from the corruption records themselves. The purpose of providing a positive
reference point is to allow a relatively high benchmark from which the negative eval-
uation point of the corruption record will presumably drop, hence allowing enough
variation in the dependent variable. A similar approach was used in Weitz-Shapiro
& Winters (2015a, 2015b).
The corruption treatment was provided by informing subjects that the State Au-
dit Court examined how the candidate used public funds and detected irregularities
such as over-invoicing and no-bid public purchases. In Brazil, State Audit Courts
have an extensive role in auditing accounts of ocials at the municipal level (Ferraz
and Finan 2008; Melo, Pereira & Figueiredo 2009, Pereira & Melo 2015), and prior
research has found that they are viewed as a credible source of accusation (Weitz-
Shapiro & Winters 2015a).
The outcome variable (the probability of voting for the mayor) was measured with
a 7 point Likert scale. An alternative outcome measure, satisfaction with the mayor,
was also measured using a second 7 point Likert scale.
I included a pre-treatment questionnaire with several demographic and socio-
economic questions, along with questions measuring subject's sources of political in-
formation, whether he or she regularly follow political news and discusses politics,
whether he or she can properly identify the role of Audit Courts, and whether he or
she attends public or private hospitals28. In addition, I included a screener question.
28More specically, the question asks subjects if the last time they went to a hospital they attended
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The structure of the screener replicated the structure of the vignette in that the vari-
ation in the additional information details in the treatment were introduced in the
fourth line, while the screener's instruction to skip the question were introduced in the
third line of the paragraph. The complete screener questions wording is presented in
appendix L. Hence, assuming equal attention, subjects who passed the screener were
also the most likely to capture variation introduced across the dierent treatment
conditions.29
3.4.2 Hypotheses and Expected Results
The rst study was designed to test whether the extension of information and the
source and destination of misappropriated funds aect subjects' responses. The rst
hypothesis posits that when subjects learn more details about the corruption inci-
dent, they are more likely to reject the candidate than when they learn only limited
information (H1). The second hypothesis posits that when subjects learn that the
corruption incident involves misuse of funds destined to public services, they are more
likely to reject the candidate than when they learn that those funds were destined to
expenses where the social benets are less obvious (H2). The third hypothesis posits
that corruption used for the candidate's private gain generates a stronger response
than corruption used to support other members of the party (H3).
To test these hypotheses, I used a six-treatment design with one condition where
subjects learn that the candidate has no antecedents of corruption (Tr1), one condi-
tion where subjects only learn that the candidate has antecedents of administrative
a public or a private hospital.
29Berinsky et al. (2014) contend that subjects can be assumed to pay equal attention across an
entire questionnaire. Following their recommendation I present both results for all subjects and for
the sample of subjects who passed the screener question.
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irregularities, and four additional treatment conditions with complementary informa-
tion on the source of misappropriated funds (expenditures destined to public hospitals
or expenditures in technical services to repair the computers in municipal oces) and
on the destination of those funds (a mayor's bank account or to support other party
members) with a 2x2 factorial design. The two alternative sources of funds attempt
to capture a continuum from expenditures that are generally more valued by voters
(social services) to expenditures where the benets for the public are less obvious
(regular expenditures). In particular, I use the example of public health, for which
there is shared responsibility between the municipal and federal government. Recent
surveys show that this is a top concern among the Brazilian public30. Both examples
were drawn from real-world cases. The rst example is a frequent case of accounts
rejection for mayors. Many municipalities receive federal transfers from a specic
program31 geared to improve the quality of public health and are subsequently au-
dited by the Federal Audit Court32. The second example is drawn from a particular
case of account rejection of a city councilman in a municipality of the State of Ceara,
although similar cases of account rejection for misuse of funds spent in technical ser-
vices are not uncommon.
The two alternative destinations of misappropriated funds attempted to assess
whether personal gain was punished more strongly than diversion of funds for the
benet of other party members. The specic language of each vignette can be found
30http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/noticias/Paginas/Brasileiro-elege-saude-seguranca-e-
educacao-como-prioridades-para-2014.aspx. Accessed 4/21/2015.
31The name of the program is the Fundo Nacional de Saude (FNS) or National Health Fund. For
more information see: http://www.fns.saude.gov.br/indexExterno.jsf
32In Brazil mayors are only audited by the Federal Audit Court for the use of funds transferred
from the federal government; the State Audit Court (or the Municipal Audit Court in the few cases
where there is a specic Audit Court at the municipal level) is in charge of auditing municipal funds.
Technically, the fact that the treatment refers to a State Audit Court (and not to the Federal Audit
Court) would mean that misused funds were either state or municipal funds, which is the same
hypothetical source of the funds for the alternative treatment.
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in appendix A.
Summarizing the six treatment conditions:
Tr1 No Corruption: Information that the candidate has no antecedents of misuse
of public funds.
Tr2 Baseline (Limited Information): Information that the Audit Court found various
irregularities when analyzing how the mayor used public funds.
Tr3 Health Care/Bank Account (Extended Information): Baseline plus information
that the misused funds come from a social program and that those funds were di-
verted to a bank account owned by the mayor.
Tr4 Health Care/Reelection (Extended Information): Baseline plus information that
the misused funds come from a social program and that funds misused were diverted
to support party members who supported the mayor in the electoral campaign.
Tr5 Computer/Bank Account (Extended Information): Baseline plus information
that the misused funds come from regular expenditures (expenditures in technical
services to repair computers in municipal oces) and that misused funds were di-
verted to a bank account owned by the mayor.
Tr6 Computer/Reelection (Extended Information): Baseline plus information that
the misused funds come from regular expenditures (expenditures in technical services
to repair computers in municipal oces) and that funds misused were diverted to
support party members who supported the mayor in the electoral campaign.
The hypotheses and expected results can be summarized as follows:
Extended Information (H1): Providing more information on the source and desti-
nation of funds from the corruption incident elicits a stronger negative response from
subjects.
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Expected results (H1): Support for candidate in Tr3 = Tr4 = Tr5 = Tr6 < Tr2 <
Tr1.
Dierent Eects/Public Costs (H2): Voters are particularly sensitive to information
on the public costs of corruption when the source of misappropriated funds comes
from a social program.
Expected results (H2): Support for candidate in Tr3 = Tr4 < Tr5 = Tr6.
Dierent Eects/Private Benets (H3): Voters are willing to condone corruption
when misappropriated funds are being diverted to support other party members.
Expected results (H3): Support for candidate in Tr3 = Tr5 < Tr4 = Tr6.
3.4.3 Results
The experiment was run between August and September 2015. In total 1,598 sub-
jects completed the survey (sample descriptive statistics are available in Appendix
B) and a total of 774 subjects passed the screener (48.4 % of the total sample). The
experimental sample is largely representative, although individuals with lower levels
of education are underrepresented. This pattern has also been found in prior studies
recruiting subjects with Facebook advertisements in Brazil (Boas 2014). The sample
also shows a larger share of women. Both patterns are consistent across the three
studies.
In this section, I discuss results from OLS regression analyses, using both a basic
model with no controls and additional models controlling for a number of covariates.
The full models are included to control for possible sample imbalances (see results of
a multinomial logistic model testing sample balance in appendix C). In all analyses, I
will particularly focus on results from the sample of subjects who passed the screener,
as I consider screener passage the best proxy for subject compliance. Subjects who
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don't read the entire vignette would not capture any dierence across the various
treatments and hence could be considered non-compliant33.
In table 3.1, I report mean support for each treatment condition.
TABLE 3.1: Mean Vote Intention
Study # 1. One Screener
No Corruption Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
5.48 2.11 1.59 1.49 1.43 1.64
(0.18) (0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
N=123 N=124 N=141 N=133 N=122 N=131
Standard Deviation in Parenthesis. DV: Likelihood to Vote for Candidate.
In table 3.2 I present results from the OLS analyses both for the entire sam-
ple and for the sample that passed the screener. Vote intention is the dependent
variable. The baseline \limited information" condition is the reference category. The
rst column shows a basic model without controls. The second column reports re-
sults from the entire sample. The third column presents results including a number
of socio-demographic controls. In column four I additional control for knowledge of
the Audit Court's role. In the last column, I include a treatment interaction with the
dummy variable indicating if the subject attends public hospitals.
All analyses show that subjects are signicantly less likely to support the cor-
rupt candidate in any of the \extended information" treatments as compared to the
\limited information" treatment. This is consistent for both the entire sample and
for the samples that passed the screener. In the rst column I consider results for
the sample that passed the screener without controls. It shows eect sizes ranging
from an almost 9 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting the mayor to
33This was specied in the pre-analysis plans for studies # 2 and #3, the only studies pre-
registered.
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an almost 10 percentage point decrease. Results from the other samples also show
results that suggest that subjects in any of the \extended information" conditions are
less likely to support the candidate
In addition, the no corruption interaction with the dummy indicating whether
the subject attends public hospitals is signicant, while all other interaction terms
are not signicant. This suggests little support for hypothesis 1.1. as the interaction
terms of vignettes specifying that misappropriated funds came from health related
expenditures do not present signicant results. Results also show that voters are
less likely to support a corrupt candidate in any of the information conditions with
respect to the no corruption condition, which is consistent with the literature.
In appendix D I present results of the ANOVA dierence-in-means test. Vote in-
tention is the dependent variable. Each row presents results of the dierence-in-means
test with respect to the condition specied in top of each column. For instance, the
health care/bank account condition has dierence-in-means of -0.52 with respect to
the baseline condition. In parenthesis I report Holm adjusted p-values34. In brackets
I report non adjusted p-values. When considering Holm adjusted p-values, results
show that the combinations health care/reelection and computer/bank account are
signicant with respect to the baseline condition. The combination health care/bank
account is very close to the signicance level (p=0.05). When using non adjusted
p-values all \extended information" vignettes show signicant results with respect to
the \limited information" condition. If the dependent variable is shifted to satisfac-
tion with mayor all \extended information" treatments are signicant with respect to
the baseline condition using both Holm adjusted p-values and non adjusted p-values,
with eect sizes range within the same magnitude (between a 7 and an almost 10
34I report adjusted p-values, in addition to the non adjusted p-values, to control for family wise
error term, as in all studies I will be running multiple comparisons.
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percentage point decrease). Results are displayed in table E.3.1 in appendix E. In
addition, in appendix F I present dierence-in-means results for the entire sample.
Only the health care/reelection and computer/bank account show signicant dier-
ences with respect to the baseline condition when using non adjusted p-values.
In table G.3.1 in the appendix I report results of a logistic regression assessing
whether specic subgroups are more likely to pass the screener. Results show that
more educated, older, and female subjects, as well as those who more frequently talk
about politics are more likely to pass the screener.
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TABLE 3.2: OLS Regression on Vote Intention. Baseline is the Reference Category
Study # 1
Screener All Subjects Screener Screener Screener
No Corruption 3.37** 2.80*** 3.29*** 3.29*** 2.88***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.29)
Health Care/Bank Account -0.52*** -0.37** -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.77***
(0.19) (0.02) (0.19) (0.20) (0.27)
Health Care/Reelection -0.62*** -0.42** -0.63*** -0.61*** -0.69**
(0.19) (0.01) (0.19) (0.20) (0.28)
Computer/Bank Account -0.69*** -0.43** -0.69*** -0.65*** -0.61**
(0.20) (0.01) (0.20) (0.20) (0.28)
Computer/Reelection -0.49** -0.37** -0.50** -0.47** -0.55**
(0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.28)
Education -0.05** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Income -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Sex -0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.02
(0.97) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Knowledge Audit Court -0.13 -0.14
(0.12) (0.12)
Public Hospital -0.07
(0.29)
No Corruption 0.91**
*Public Hospital (0.42)
Health Care/Bank Account 0.47
*Public Hospital (0.40)
Health Care/Reelection 0.22
*Public Hospital (0.41)
Computer/Bank Account -0.13
*Public Hospital (0.41)
Computer/Reelection 0.18
*Public Hospital (0.41)
Intercept 2.11*** 2.56*** 2.09*** 2.17*** 2.37***
(0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 774 1,598 774 774 774
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Public Hospital=1 if subject attends public hospital. Sex coded as Female=1, Male=0
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In sum, results from study # 1 show strong support for hypothesis 1 and no
support for hypotheses 2 and 3. As subjects learn more about either the sources or
the destinations of misappropriated funds, they are more likely to reject the candi-
date. However, these results do not show which specic piece of information explains
the stronger eect. The set-up of the second experiment attempts to test various
competing hypotheses on the type of additional information driving the eect.
3.5 Second Study
The second experiment was designed to identify which specic piece of information,
the source of misappropriated funds or the destination of those funds, explains voters'
stronger rejection of the corrupt candidate. I used a set-up in which subjects were
provided either with information about where the misappropriated funds come from
or where those funds were diverted. To test the public costs hypothesis, I used the
example of the public health expenditure (which would presumably have a higher
social impact); to test the private benet hypothesis, I used the bank account exam-
ple, which highlights the corrupt's candidate private gain. Each treatment included
specic details of the accusation to test the rival hypotheses (see below).
3.5.1 Rival Hypotheses: The Role of Additional Information
I test a set of alternative hypotheses assessing the role of additional information.
I maintain three alternative hypotheses. The rst one states that any more extensive
information, regardless of what kind of information it is, reinforces the treatment ef-
fect. Consequently, any \extended information" treatment will have a stronger eect
than the baseline treatment. According to this hypothesis, more information means
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a stronger treatment (by providing a stronger treatment dosage). Subjects' reactions
will be stronger not due to any particular piece of information, but simply because
there is more information on the wrongdoing.
The second hypothesis states that information providing specic details about
the accusation generates a stronger eect. Here I rely on prior research, grounded in
dual-coding theory (Paivio 1986), which has shown that concrete news has a stronger
eect than abstract news (David 1998). Plausibly, the additional information that
subjects receive in the \extended information" treatments might increase the eect
because this information is making the news more concrete, creating a \story" out
of information that otherwise can be perceived as abstract. To test this hypothesis I
included an additional vignette with more abstract procedural information (the pro-
cedural information condition). When subjects are provided with more information
either on the source of misappropriated funds or where those funds were diverted they
get a real, concrete story, as opposed to those confronted with the abstract procedural
treatment. Consequently, the treatment eect in those cases will be stronger.
Finally, I included a third hypothesis that focuses on the often insucient back-
ground information that subjects have on the role of Audit Courts. I posit here that
subjects in experiment # 1 used the additional information to interpret what a nega-
tive audit means, which not all subjects might completely understand. In each of the
three experiments I ran I included the question asking subjects to identify the role of
Audit Courts. The percentage of subjects who correctly answered this question was
53.6 % in the rst study, 49.8% in the second study, and 49.3 % in the third study.
To test this hypothesis, the procedural information condition provides additional in-
formation on the role of the Audit Court. Only abstract information is provided to
accommodate hypothesis # 2. In particular, this hypothesis will be tested with the
sample of subjects who are less knowledgeable of the role of Audit Courts.
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3.5.2 Experimental Design
The set-up of the second experiment is similar to the rst experiment. Subjects
were recruited with similar Facebook ads. I used the same pre- and post-treatment
questionnaires. I included a second screener question (following Berinsky, Margolis,
& Sances 2014) with the same structure as the rst screener, instructing subjects
in the third line of the paragraph to choose two specic and nonsensical choices in a
multiple choice question (see appendix L for the exact screener wording). In addition,
I measured the time subjects spent reading the treatment vignettes to test if those
who passed the screeners also spent more time reading the vignette. This experiment
was run between November and December 2015.
I introduced a few relatively minor variations in the information on the candidate's
prior positive records. First, in contrast to the rst experiment, positive records were
included after the information on the irregularities detected (while in the rst exper-
iment those records were introduced before the treatment). In addition, I mentioned
a new area of positive records (public transport) as well as a line stating that the
candidate is still very popular and has good chances of being reelected (the exact
vignette wording is available in appendix A). The vignette also made explicit that
the Audit Court rejected the candidate's accounts, something that was not explicitly
stated in the rst experiment. I informed subjects the despite the decision of the Au-
dit Court, the candidate was allowed to run for reelection (in Brazil candidates with
accounts rejected are not allowed to run, but they often circumvent this restriction
by appealing in the judiciary).
The baseline treatment informed subjects that the Audit Court found irregulari-
ties and consequently decided to reject the mayor's accounts. The procedural details
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treatment added to the baseline treatment information on the role of the Audit Court,
as well as information on the session and chamber of the Audit Court that decided
to reject accounts (all information that is frequent in news articles). The public costs
version was similar to the baseline, with additional information that the irregularities
included over-invoicing and no-bid contracts in expenditures intended to build a pri-
mary health care center. The private benets treatment was similar to the baseline
condition, with additional information that the Audit Court found that the mayor
created a civil association to divert public funds to his own bank account. I used the
Audit Court as the agency that investigates diversion of funds, though in Brazil this
crime is more often investigated by the regular court system, to avoid varying the
institution making the accusation. Presumably, subjects are more familiar with the
procedures of the regular court system than with those of the Audit Court system.
If so, introducing two dierent institutions might bias comparisons across groups.
Summarizing the four treatment conditions:
Tr1 Baseline (Limited Information): Information that the candidate has accounts
rejected by the Audit Court.
Tr2 Procedural (Extended Information): Baseline plus information on the Audit
Courts procedures and mechanisms leading to that decision.
Tr3 Health Care (Extended Information): Baseline plus information that misappro-
priated funds came from a program to build a primary care health center.
Tr4 Bank Account (Extended Information): Baseline plus information that funds
misappropriated were diverted to the mayor's bank account.
3.5.3 Hypotheses and Expected Results
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Hypothesis 1 (Private Benet): When voters learn additional details about where
money was diverted to, they are less likely to support a corrupt candidate than when
they learn additional details on the source of misappropriated funds.
Expected results (H1): Support for candidate in Tr4 < support for candidate in Tr3,
Tr2 & Tr1.
Hypothesis 2 (Public Costs/Consequentional Morality): When voters learn additional
details about the source of misappropriated funds, they are less likely to support a
corrupt candidate than when they learn additional details about where funds were
diverted.
Expected results (H2): Support for candidate in Tr3 < support for candidate in Tr4,
Tr2 & Tr1.
Hypothesis 3 (Specic Details): When voters learn specic details of the accusation,
they are less likely to support a corrupt candidate.
Expected results (H3): Support for candidate in Tr4 = Tr3 < Tr2 = Tr1
Hypothesis 4 (Procedural Information): When voters learn more about the procedures
of the Audit Court, they are more likely to understand and believe in the accuracy
of the accusation and hence less likely to support a corrupt candidate. The eect is
expected to be higher for the subset of subjects who did not answered correctly a
question on knowledge of Audit Courts' role.
Expected results (H4): Support for candidate in Tr2 < Tr3 = Tr4
Hypothesis 5 (Any Kind of Information): When the treatment includes more infor-
mation (of any kind), voters are less likely to support a corrupt candidate.
Expected results (H5): Support for candidate in Tr4 = Tr3 = Tr2 < Tr1
3.5.4 Results
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In total, 4,894 subjects responded the survey. A total of 1,506 subjects passed at
least one screener question (31% of respondents) and a total of 701 subjects passed
both screeners (14% of respondents). In terms of time spent on the vignette's screen,
subjects who passed at least one screener spent an average of 88.6 seconds, while
subjects who did not pass any screener spent an average of 79.1 seconds. Subjects
who passed the two screeners spent an average of 89 seconds. This suggests that
subjects who passed screeners did spend more time reading the vignettes.
In table 3.3, I present mean support in each treatment condition for the sam-
ple that passed at least one screener using vote intention as the dependent variable.
In table 3.4 I present results from the OLS models. Bank account is the reference
category. Results fully support the private benets hypothesis, as the bank account
vignette signicantly reduces probability to support candidate with respect to all
other conditions. The rst column reports results for the sample that passed at least
one screener without controls. In this column, the size of the eect ranges from a de-
cline in 4.4 percentage points (with respect to the health care condition) to a decline
in 9 percentage points (with respect to the baseline condition). Results across all
other columns also show that subjects in the bank account condition are signicantly
less likely to support the candidate.
The interaction with the Audit Courts knowledge dummy is not signicant, sug-
gesting no support for H4. In appendix J, I present results of a dierence in means
for this subset of subjects. This analysis also provides evidence against H4, as only
the bank account condition shows signicant dierences with respect to the other
conditions (with the exception of its dierence with the health care condition and
with the baseline condition using Holm adjusted p-values). As for the interaction
with public hospital users, results also are not statistically signicant. In tables I.3.3
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and I.3.4 (in appendix I) I use ANOVA analysis for heteregeneous causal eects with
split samples of subjects who attend private and public hospitals. Results suggest
that subjects who attend public hospital are less likely to support the candidate in
the health care condition with respect to the baseline and procedural conditions; and
results are not signicantly dierent from the bank account condition. In contrast,
among private hospital users the health care condition is not signicantly dierent
from the other conditions (with the exception of the dierence between the health care
condition with respect to the baseline condition when using non adjusted p-values).
Results from the split samples in this study provide some support for hypothesis 1.1
(as public public hospital users seem to be more information sensitive when there are
costs aecting public hospitals). However, the interaction results in table 3.4 is not
signicant, and all other analyses in the three studies (i.e. interaction terms and split
sample dierence-in-means analyses) provide little empirical support for this hypoth-
esis.
Table D.3.2 in the appendix shows results of dierence-in-means tests with vote
intention as dependent variable for subjects who passed at least one screener. Results
using both Holm adjusted p-values and non adjusted p-values show that subjects
in the bank account condition are signicantly less likely to support the candidate.
In addition, these results also show that subjects in the health care condition are
signicantly less likely to support the candidate than subjects in the baseline and
procedural conditions.
Table E.3.2 in the appendix presents results for the estimated dierences in sat-
isfaction with mayor for the sample that passed at least one screener. Results also
fully support the private enrichment hypothesis, as the bank account condition sig-
nicantly reduces support for the candidate with respect to all the other conditions
(both using Holm adjusted p-values and non adjusted p-values). No other signicant
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results are observed.
In tables F.3.3 and F.3.4 in the appendix, I present results for the complete sample
using both vote intention and satisfaction with mayor as dependent variables. Again,
results fully support the private enrichment hypothesis. In addition, in both tables
the dierences in vote intention and satisfaction with the candidate in the procedural
and health care condition are negative and signicant with respect to the baseline
condition.
In tables H.3.1 and H.3.2 in the Appendix I present results for the sample of sub-
jects who passed both screeners. Results again show consistent support for the private
enrichment hypothesis. Only the bank account condition does not signicantly dier
from the health care condition when using probability to vote as the dependent vari-
able (with both Holm adjusted p-values and non adjusted p-values), and when using
satisfaction with mayor as the dependent variable (with Holm adjusted p-values).
There are no other statistically signicant dierences.
In sum, overall results in experiment 2 fully support the private benets hypoth-
esis.
TABLE 3.3: Mean Vote Intention
Study # 2. At Least One Screener
Baseline Procedural Health Care Bank Account
2.55 2.54 2.23 1.92
(1.83) (1.76) (1.69) (1.58)
N=381 N=381 N=384 N=360
Standard Deviation in Parenthesis. DV: Likelihood to Vote for Candidate.
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TABLE 3.4: OLS Regression on Vote Intention. Bank Account is the Reference Category.
Study # 2
Screener
(1 or 2)
All Subjects Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Screener
(1 or 2)
Baseline 0.63*** 0.48*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.46** 0.86***
(0.13) (0.08) (0.00) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19)
Procedural 0.62*** 0.29*** 0.59*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.59***
(0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19)
Health Care 0.31** 0.23*** 0.27** 0.27** 0.35* 0.47**
(0.13) (0.00) (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19)
Education -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06** -0.05**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Income -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.01) (0.28) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Sex -0.06 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.09
(0.06) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Knowledge Audit Court -0.28*** -0.34* -0.28**
(0.09) (0.19) (0.09)
Public Hospital 0.10
(0.18)
Baseline*Audit Court 0.31
(0.26)
Procedural*Audit Court 0.09
(0.25)
Health Care*Audit Court -0.15
(0.26)
Baseline*Public Hospital -0.40
(0.11)
Procedural*Public Hospital -0.06
(0.25)
Health Care*Public Hospital -0.47
(0.25)
Intercept 1.92*** 2.69*** 2.01*** 2.16*** 2.16*** 2.22***
(0.09) (0.14) (0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)
N 1,506 4,894 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Sex coded as Female=1, Male=0
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Table G.3.2 in appendix G presents the results of a logistic regression on likelihood
to pass the screeners. Similar to study # 1, more educated subjects and those who
more frequently talk about politics are more likely to pass the screeners. In contrast
to study # 1, younger subjects are more likely to pass the screener and there is no
signicant dierence between women and men. In addition, wealthier subjects are
more likely to pass the screeners, and subjects leaning on the left are more likely to
pass one screener.
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3.6 Third Study
Results of the second study showed that subsequent information on the candidate's
illicit enrichment drives a stronger punishment eect. The purpose of the third study
is twofold. First, the bank account and health care vignettes were modied to make
them more homogeneous to improve internal validity. In the second study, those vi-
gnettes included specic stories on the corruption episodes found out by the Audit
Court to accommodate its format to the one of typical real news and as a test for
the specic details versus abstract news hypothesis. The trade o is that as dierent
forms of specic stories are developed, other details of the story besides the treatment
itself might have an impact on the outcome of interest. In this new experiment, those
conditions are displayed in more homogeneous vignettes, without developing concrete
stories, so that other background conditions are kept similar.
Second, I include a new vignette with a new form of moral misbehavior to test the
\deontological morality" hypothesis. In particular, I test if the same treatment eect
could be detected when adding information that the mayor lied to the Audit Court
when justifying his use of public funds. If subjects weigh the mayor's intentions more
than the consequences of his behavior, then we should detect a similar punishment
eect when they learn that the mayor diverted funds as when they learn that he
lied. In contrast, if subjects are particularly concerned with elected ocials' illicit
enrichment, we should still detect a stronger eect in the private gain vignette.
In addition, I add a new vignette increasing the negative stimulus of the public
costs as a harder test for the private gain hypothesis. The new stimulus makes ex-
plicit the costs associated with the misuse of funds by informing subjects that as a
consequence, the primary care health center couldn't be nished. This is the costs
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condition35. The health care treatment is used as the new baseline condition (see
additional details in the summary of treatment conditions section).
3.6.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was run in January 2016. The recruitment method was similar to the
one used in studies 1 and 2, with one modication. To avoid repeated survey takers,
I used a Facebook pixel that identied and prevented showing the ad to users who
completed those surveys. In addition, I set the survey in the same Qualtrics platform
that was used in experiment 2; the survey was set to prevent re-taking the survey
(as consequence subjects who completed experiment # 2 who attempted to complete
for the rst time experiment# 3 would be considered re-takers). Finally, I included
a question asking subjects if they took a similar survey during the months that the
rst and second experiments were being run.
The baseline vignette was identical to the one used in study # 2 with only one
modication; it included the information that irregularities included over-invoicing
and no-bid contracts and that misappropriated funds came from a health care pro-
gram. That means that the new baseline condition had more information than the
baseline condition in studies # 1 and # 2. A second vignette included the information
that the candidate lied to the Audit Court when justifying expenses (lies condition).
A third vignette included the information that because of the misuse of funds, the
primary care center was not built (costs condition). A fourth vignette included the
information that the candidate diverted the misappropriated funds to his own bank
35It is not uncommon to see similar real cases, in particular when the municipal government
depends on federal transfers for education or health related expenses. In those cases, when federal
audits detect irregularities, the federal government will stop transfers. See last example in appendix
K for a similar case in real news.
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account (bank account condition). The same screener questions used in study # 2
were included. The four treatment conditions can be summarized as follows:
Tr1 Baseline (Limited Information): Information that misappropriated funds come
from a health care program.
Tr2 Lies (Extended Information): Baseline plus information stating that the mayor
lied when justifying expenses.
Tr3 Costs (Extended Information): Baseline plus information that as a result of the
misuse of funds, the primary care center was not built.
Tr4 Bank Account (Extended Information): Baseline plus information that the mis-
appropriated funds were diverted to the mayor's bank account.
3.6.2 Hypotheses and Expected Results
H1 Deontological Morality Hypothesis: Likelihood to support a corrupt candidate
drops as subjects learn additional details emphasizing the candidate's moral misbe-
havior (lying or diverting funds to his bank account).
Expected results (H1): Support for candidate in Tr2 < Tr1 & Tr3. Support in Tr4 <
Tr1 & Tr3
H2 Private Benets Hypothesis: Likelihood to support a corrupt candidate drops
specically when subjects learn details on the illicit enrichment of the candidate.
Expected results (H2): Support for candidate in Tr4 < Tr1, Tr2 & Tr3
H3 Public Costs Hypothesis: Likelihood to support a corrupt candidate drops as sub-
jects learn additional details about the program from which funds were misused and
on the specic costs of that mismanagement.
Expected results (H3): Support for candidate in Tr3 < Tr1, Tr2 & Tr4
88
3.6.3 Analysis and Results
A total of 4,918 subjects completed the survey. A total of 563 subjects of those
4,918 subjects had taken one of the previous surveys. These subjects were dropped
from the nal analysis (resulting in a total N of 4355 subjects). Subjects who passed
at least one screener spent on average 100 seconds reading the treatment vignette,
while subjects who failed to pass any screener spent an average of 90 seconds. Sub-
jects who passed both screeners spent an average of 103 seconds reading the vignette.
This suggests, again, that screener passage is a good indicator of treatment compli-
ance.
In table 3.5, I present mean vote intention for the sample of subjects who passed
either screener.
TABLE 3.5: Mean Vote Intention
Study # 3. At Least One Screener
Baseline Lies Costs Bank Account
2.15 2.25 2.24 1.84
(1.68) (1.72) (1.65) (1.44)
N=397 N=380 N=371 N=386
Standard Deviation in Parenthesis. DV: Likelihood to Vote for Candidate.
In table 3.6, I present results of the OLS analyses. Bank account is the reference
category. Results fully support the private benet hypothesis. In the rst column I
presents results using the sample that passed at least one screener without controls.
Subjects in the bank account condition are signicantly less likely to support the can-
didate than subjects in all other conditions. The magnitude of the eect ranges from
a 4.4 to a 5.8 percentage point decline in the probability of voting for the mayor. The
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relative decline in the magnitude with respect to studies # 1 and # 2 is probably a
result of the additional information provided in the baseline condition. Results from
the sample of all candidates presents similar results with the only exception that the
dierence between the lies and the bank account condition is not signicant. In the
third and fourth columns I use the sample that passed at least one screener with var-
ious controls. Results also fully support the private benets hypothesis. In the last
column I include the interactions with the public hospital dummy. In this analysis,
the dierence between the bank account condition and the other conditions is not
signicant (at the .05 level) and the interaction is not signicant. This is the only
model, though, where the dierences are not signicant at the .05 level.
In table D.3.3 in appendix D, I show results for the dierence-in-means test for
subjects who passed at least one screener. Results also fully support the private
benets hypothesis as the dierence between this condition and all other conditions
is signicant (with both Holm adjusted p-values and with non adjusted p-values).
No other signicant dierences are observed. Table E.3.3 in appendix E presents re-
sults of similar analyses using the alternative dependent variable. These results also
provide full support for the private benets hypothesis. Results with the sample of
all subjects (in tables F.3.5 and F.3.6 in the appendix) are also consistent, with the
only exception that the dierences between the bank account condition and the lies
condition are not signicant (using both vote intention and satisfaction with mayor
as dependent variables and with any of the p-value estimations). Results with the
sample that passed both screeners (in tables H.3.3 and H.3.4 in the appendix) are
also consistent, although some dierences between the bank account condition and
the other conditions are not statistically signicant at the .05 level; in particular, the
dierences between the bank account and the lies conditions.
Tables I.3.5 and I.3.6 in the appendix provide evidence against hypothesis 1.1, as
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public hospital users are not information sensitive when provided with evidence of
the costs of corruption. We should note, however, that in study # 3, the health care
information is present across all conditions.
Table G.3.3 in the appendix presents results of the probability to answer correctly
the screener questions, with results consistent with those of the previous surveys
(although in this case women are less likely to pass screener).
TABLE 3.6: OLS Regression on Vote Intention. Bank Account is the Reference Category
Study # 3
Screener All Subjects Screener Screener Screener
(1 or 2) (1 or 2) (1 or 2) (1 or 2)
Baseline 0.31*** 0.19** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*
(0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17)
Lies 0.41*** 0.12 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.30*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17)
Costs 0.40*** 0.28*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.33*
(0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18)
Education -0.03** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Income -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Sex -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.21) (0.83) (0.08) (0.08)
Audit Court Knowledge -0.16* -0.15*
(0.09)
Baseline*Public Hospital 0.07
(0.23)
Lies*Public Hospital 0.27
(0.23)
Costs*Public Hospital 0.20
(0.24)
Intercept 1.84*** 2.60*** 2.57***
(0.08) (0.22) (0.26)
N 1,538 4,355 1,538 1,538 1,538
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sex coded as Female=1, Male=0
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3.7 Conclusions
This study provides evidence that dierent types of information on the same cor-
ruption incident aect subjects' reaction towards the corrupt candidates involved in
the incident. The eects of these manipulations on subjects' response were used to
infer the type of ethical considerations behind their rejection of corrupt candidates.
Results from study # 1 show that voters' rejection is not contingent upon the type of
expenditure from which funds were misappropriated, nor on whether funds were used
for self-enrichment or for the benet of other party members. Results from studies #
2 and # 3 provide consistent evidence that subjects' judgment does not rely on a cost
evaluation of the consequences of corruption, nor it is based on a strict deontological
conception, insofar as not every type of immoral behavior is equally punished. The
strongest rejection is specically triggered by information on illicit enrichment. This
means that in subjects' evaluation of corrupt candidates, their judgment is grounded
on a restricted moral conception that considers that the public oce should never be
used for illicit enrichment.
These results show that corruption is viewed more as a candidate's trait than as
a malfeasance bearing negative consequences. Learning about the costs of corruption
doesn't increase salience of the corruption treatment, as subjects weigh corruption as
a candidate's attribute rather than as a cause of specic negative outcomes.
We should note, however, that all vignettes presented incumbent mayors who had
positive backgrounds records in a number of areas. A limited interpretation of this
study, therefore, is that the ndings are only valid for the cases of candidates with
good records (outside of the corruption incident). That is, voters might be more in-
formation sensitive to public costs when incumbents show worse background records.
Whether information sensitivity varies across this or other dimensions of candidacy
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could be tested in future research.
These ndings have important repercussions as we interpret the political conse-
quences of corruption scandals. They suggest that when the evidence of corruption is
grounded on proofs of illicit enrichment, the eect of such a scandal on public opinion
will be stronger. In contrast, when the information is grounded in oenses such as
over-invoicing or no bid-purchases of specic government expenditures, the impact
on public opinion will be weaker.
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Appendix A. Vignettes
First Study Vignettes:
Treatment 1
Imagine that you were living in another municipality of Brazil similar to the one
in which you currently live and that current the mayor in this municipality is run-
ning for reelection. Since he has been mayor conditions in his municipality have
signicantly improved. He completed new public works, and the street cleaning has
signicantly improved. The State Audit Court examined how he used public funds
and concluded that there were no irregularities in his use of public funds.
Versions 2-6
Imagine that you were living in another municipality of Brazil similar to the one
in which you currently live and that the current mayor in this municipality is run-
ning for reelection. Since he has been mayor, conditions in his municipality have
signicantly improved. He completed new public works, and the street cleaning has
signicantly improved. The State Audit Court examined how he used public funds
and concluded that there were many irregularities such as purchases without bidding
and over-invoicing [in funds spent to improve the quality of public hospitals/ in funds
spent in technical services for maintenance of computers in several municipal oces/
(OR NOTHING)]. Subsequent investigations of the State Audit Court showed that
funds were diverted [to the mayor's bank account/ to benet members of the mayor's
party who worked with him in the electoral campaign/ (OR OMIT THIS LINE)].
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Second and Third Study Vignettes:
Imagine that you were living in another municipality of Brazil similar to the one
in which you currently live and that the current mayor in this municipality is running
for reelection. The State Audit Court examined how he used public funds when he
was mayor and concluded that there were many irregularities and consequently re-
jected his accounts [Insert 1/ Insert 2/ Insert 3/ Insert 4].
Despite the decision, the candidate was allowed to run for reelection. The candidate
is still very popular and has good chances of being reelected. Since he was elected,
conditions in the municipality have signicantly improved. As mayor he completed
new public works, improved street cleaning, as well as the quality of public transport.
Second Study:
Insert 1 (Baseline): [Nothing]
Insert 2 (Procedural): The decision to reject accounts was made by the rst chamber
of the Audit court, the agency in charge of auditing the use of public funds. The
investigation determined that the use of public money was not in conformity with the
principles established by law.
Insert 3 (Health Care): The investigation of the Audit Court showed irregularities in
the use of resources destined for a health care program. The Court determined that
the mayor is responsible for over-invoicing in hiring a company to build a primary
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care health center and for non bidding in a purchase of material that was intended
to be used for this center.
Insert 4 (Bank Account): Subsequent investigations of the State Audit Court showed
that funds were diverted to a mayor's bank account. According to the investigation,
the mayor created a civic association through which he signed a contract used to
divert public funds to his own bank account.
Third Study:
Insert 1 (Baseline): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor is respon-
sible for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were intended to build a
primary care health center.
Insert 2 (Lies): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor is respon-
sible for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were intended to build a
primary care health center. The Court also showed that the mayor lied when he tes-
tied that he did the required bid for various purchases as several of the alternative
budgets he presented were faked.
Insert 3 (Costs): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor is respon-
sible for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were intended to build a
primary care health center. The Court also showed that as a consequence of those
irregularities the primary health care center could not be nished.
Insert 4 (Bank Account): The investigation of the Court showed that the mayor
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is responsible for over-invoicing and no-bid purchases in funds that were destined to
build a primary care health center. The Court also showed that the over expenses
and no-bid purchases were used by the mayor to divert part of those funds to his own
bank account.
Follow up Questions (Common for the Three Studies):
How likely would you vote for a candidate like this?
Not at all o o o o o o o Very likely
How satised would you feel with a mayor like this?
Not at all satised o o o o o o o Very satised
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Appendix B. Sample Descriptive Statistics.
TABLE B.3.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics. All Subjects
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Census
Household Income
0-2 x minimum wage 42.3 48.0 44.1 38.5
2-5 x minimum wage 32.0 30.2 30.9 36.4
5+ X minimum wage 16.3 15.1 17.7 25.1
No Response 9.4 6.7 7.3
Region
North 4.6 3.9 4.1 7.4
Northeast 15.3 16.2 16.0 26.6
Center-West 6.5 6.7 7.4 7.3
Southeast 50.9 49.2 47.5 43.8
South 14.4 14.9 14.5 14.9
No Response 8.3 9.1 10.5
Education (18 years old or older)
Primary Incomplete or Less 5.5 9.6 8.2 45.1
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete 14.8 18.9 16.4 16.6
Secondary Complete or Tertiary Incomplete 44.1 45.8 43.1 27.9
Tertiary Complete 35.3 25.6 32.3 10.0
No Response 0.2 0.1 0.1
Other
Age (median) 34 30 31 38
Male 33.1 29.5 34.2 48.2
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TABLE B.3.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics. At Least One Screener
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Census
Household Income
0-2 x minimum wage 37.3 36.1 31.1 38.5
2-5 x minimum wage 34.9 37.3 35.9 36.4
5+ X minimum wage 20.7 22.4 28.1 25.1
No Response 7.1 4.2 4.9
Region (NA omitted)
North 3.4 4.7 4.0 7.4
Northeast 15.2 13.6 13.9 26.6
Center-West 6.5 6.8 7.6 7.3
Southeast 51.0 50.4 49.3 43.8
South 14.7 17.3 16.1 14.9
No Response 9.2 7.2 9.0
Education (18 years old or older)
Primary Incomplete or Less 3.6 2.8 2.7 45.1
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete 11.8 11.8 8.5 16.6
Secondary Complete or Tertiary Incomplete 42.1 48.6 43.7 27.9
Tertiary Complete 42.2 36.8 45.2 10.0
No Response 0.3 0.1 0.0
Other
Age (median) 35 31 33 38
Male 29.2 30.0 38.0 48.2
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TABLE B.3.3: Sample Descriptive Statistics. All Subjects
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Americas Barometer
Party
None 72.6 77.0 75.9 77.1
PT 7.1 5.3 6.2 12.1
PSDB 5.8 4.4 4.9 2.4
PMDB 4.4 3.2 3.1 3.9
Other 10.1 10.1 9.8 4.5
TABLE B.3.4: Sample Descriptive Statistics. At Least One Screener
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Americas Barometer
Party
None 72.9 79.0 77.0 77.1
PT 8.0 5.2 6.3 12.1
PSDB 6.3 5.0 5.6 2.4
PMDB 3.2 1.8 2.1 3.9
Other 9.6 9.1 9.1 4.5
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Appendix C. Sample Balance Tests
TABLE C.3.1: Balance Across Treatment Groups. Multinomial Logistic Regression
Passed Screener. Study # 1
No Corruption Baseline Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Reelection Bank Account Reelection
Education 0.79 0.26 0.04 0.75 0.10
(0.62) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Income -0.24 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.75)
Gender (Male) 0.87 -0.01 0.27 -0.14 -0.00
(0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28)
Knowledge Audit Court 0.28 0.58** 0.38 0.52* 0.68**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Intercept -0.95 -0.49 -0.94 -0.54 -0.79
(0.70) (0.68) (0.68) (0.69) (0.69)
N (Total = 776 )
Standard error in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Health Care/Bank Account is the reference category.
TABLE C.3.2: Balance Across Treatment Groups. Multinomial Logistic Regression
At Least One Screener. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Education -0.00 -0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Income -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Gender (Male) -0.13 -0.03 -0.14
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Knowledge Audit Court -0.12 -0.23 0.02
(0.27) (0.15) (0.15)
Intercept 0.37 0.25 -0.10
(0.39) (0.39) (0.40)
N (Total = 1,506 )
Standard error in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Baseline is the reference category.
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TABLE C.3.3: Balance Across Treatment Groups. Multinomial Logistic Regression
At Least One Screener. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Education -0.15 -0.01 -0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Income 0.11** 0.07 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Gender (Male) 0.12 -0.04 -0.14
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Knowledge Audit Court -0.01 -0.10 0.01
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Intercept -0.48 0.24 0.43
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
N (Total = 1,538 )
Standard error in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Baseline is the reference category.
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Appendix D. Replication of Results using ANOVA. At Least One Screener
TABLE D.3.1: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Passed Screener. Study # 1
Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
No Corruption -3.37 -3.89 -3.99 -4.05 -3.85
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Baseline -0.52 -0.62 -0.69 -0.49
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Health Care/Bank Account -0.10 -0.16 0.04
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
[0.60] [0.40] [0.84]
Health Care/Reelection -0.06 0.14
(1.00) (1.00)
[0.75] [0.47]
Computer/Bank Account 0.20
(1.00)
[0.31]
Computer/Reelection
N (Total = 776 ) 124 141 133 122 131
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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TABLE D.3.2: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
At Least One Screener. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline -0.02 -0.32 -0.63
(0.90) (0.04) (0.00)
[0.90] [0.01] [0.00]
Procedural -0.31 -0.62
(0.04) (0.00)
[0.01] [0.00]
Health Care -0.31
(0.04)
[0.02]
Bank Account
N (Total = 1,506) 381 384 360
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
TABLE D.3.3: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
At Least One Screener. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline 0.09 0.09 -0.31
(1.00) (1.00) (0.03)
[0.42] [0.46] [0.00]
Lies -0.01 -0.41
(1.00) (0.00)
[0.95] [0.00]
Costs -0.40
(0.00)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 1,538) 380 371 386
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Appendix E. Analyses using Satisfaction As DV. At Least One Screener
TABLE E.3.1: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
Passed Screener. Study # 1
Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
No Corruption -3.48 -4.08 -3.97 -4.17 -3.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Baseline -0.60 -0.49 -0.69 -0.49
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Health Care/Bank Account 0.11 -0.09 0.11
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
[0.51] [0.59] [0.50]
Health Care/Reelection -0.20 0.01
(1.00) (1.00)
[0.24] [0.98]
Computer/Bank Account 0.20
(1.00)
[0.23]
Computer/Reelection
N (Total = 776 ) 124 141 133 122 131
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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TABLE E.3.2: Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
At Least One Screener. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline -0.03 -0.22 -0.69
(0.81) (0.15) (0.00)
[0.81] [0.05] [0.00]
Procedural -0.20 -0.66
(0.17) (0.00)
[0.08] [0.00]
Health Care -0.46
(0.00)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 1,506) 381 384 360
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
TABLE E.3.3: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
At Least One Screener. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline -0.02 0.05 -0.25
(1.00) (1.00) (0.10)
[0.89] [0.67] [0.02]
Lies 0.06 -0.24
(1.00) (0.12)
[0.57] [0.03]
Costs -0.30
(0.04)
[0.01]
Bank Account
N (Total = 1,538) 386 380 371
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Appendix F. Analyses for All Subjects.
TABLE F.3.1: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
All Subjects. Study # 1
Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
No Corruption -2.77 -3.07 -3.13 -3.17 -3.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Baseline -0.29 -0.35 -0.39 -0.25
(0.56) (0.30) (0.19) (0.91)
[0.07] [0.03] [0.02] [0.13]
Health Care/Bank Account -0.06 -0.10 0.04
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
[0.71] [0.54] [0.80]
Health Care/Reelection -0.04 0.10
(1.00) (1.00)
[0.81] [0.55]
Computer/Bank Account 0.14
(1.00)
[0.40]
Computer/Reelection
N (Total = 2,405 ) 246 296 267 266 257
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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TABLE F.3.2: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
All Subjects. Study # 1
Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
No Corruption -2.96 -3.27 -3.34 -3.30 -3.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Baseline -0.31 -0.37 -0.34 -0.26
(0.24) (0.11) (0.21) (0.61)
[0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.09]
Health Care/Bank Account -0.06 -0.02 0.06
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
[0.67] [0.88] [0.68]
Health Care/Reelection 0.04 0.12
(1.00) (1.00)
[0.78] [0.41]
Computer/Bank Account 0.08
(1.00)
[0.58]
Computer/Reelection
N (Total = 2,405 ) 246 296 267 266 257
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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TABLE F.3.3: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
All Subjects. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline -0.18 -0.25 -0.48
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00)
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
Procedural -0.07 -0.30
(0.39) (0.00)
[0.39] [0.00]
Health Care -0.24
(0.00)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 4,894) 1,260 1,224 1,177
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
TABLE F.3.4: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
All Subjects. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline -0.25 -0.27 -0.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Procedural -0.11 -0.38
(0.87) (0.00)
[0.87] [0.00]
Health Care -0.39
(0.00)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 4,894) 1,260 1,224 1,177
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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TABLE F.3.5: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
All Subjects. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline -0.06 0.08 -0.20
(0.58) (0.58) (0.04)
[0.47] [0.29] [0.01]
Lies 0.14 0.15
(0.25) (0.25)
[0.07] [0.06]
Costs -0.29
(0.00)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 4,355) 1,054 1,041 1,043
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
TABLE F.3.6: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
All Subjects. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline -0.16 -0.03 0.19
(0.12) (1.00) (0.04)
[0.03] [0.65] [0.01]
Lies 0.12 -0.04
(0.25) (1.00)
[0.08] [0.57]
Costs -0.16
(0.11)
[0.02]
Bank Account
N (Total = 4,355) 1,054 1,041 1,043
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Appendix G. Likelihood to Pass Screener.
TABLE G.3.1: Probability to Answer Correctly the Screener Question
Study # 1
Screener
Intercept -0.24***
(0.08)
Education 0.03***
(0.01)
Age 0.01***
(0.00)
Sex 0.11***
(0.00)
Income 0.01
(0.01)
Ideology 0.01
(0.01)
Frequency of Political Conversation 0.06***
(0.01)
Frequency of News Following 0.01
(1.00)
N 2,405
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All results from logistic regression.
Sex coded as Female=1, Male=0. Ideology measured in a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
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TABLE G.3.2: Probability to Answer Correctly the Screener Question
Study # 2
One Screener Two Screeners
Education 0.05*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.01** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Sex 0.02 -0.01
(0.21) (0.35)
Income 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ideology -0.01** -0.01
(0.04) (0.58)
Frequency of Political Conversation 0.04*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00)
Frequency of News Following 0.01 0.01
(0.20) (0.50)
N 4,894 4,894
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All results from logistic regression.
Sex coded as Female=1, Male=0. Ideology measured in a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
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TABLE G.3.3: Probability to Answer Correctly the Screener Question
Study # 3
One Screener Two Screeners
Education 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.01** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Sex -0.03** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Income 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ideology -0.00 -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
Frequency of Political Conversation 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Frequency of News Following -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.88)
N 4,355 4,355
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All results from logistic regression.
Sex coded as Female=1, Male=0. Ideology measured in a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
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Appendix H: Analyses for Subjects who Passed Both Screeners.
TABLE H.3.1: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Both Screeners. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline 0.02 -0.27 -0.54
(0.90) (0.38) (0.01)
[0.89] [0.12] [0.00]
Procedural -0.29 -0.57
(0.38) (0.00)
[0.09] [0.00]
Health Care -0.27
(0.38)
[0.13]
Bank Account
N (Total = 701) 173 173 164
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
TABLE H.3.2: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
Both Screeners. Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline 0.03 -0.27 -0.64
(0.83) (0.19) (0.00)
[0.82] [0.09] [0.00]
Procedural -0.30 -0.68
(0.19) (0.00)
[0.06] [0.00]
Health Care -0.38
(0.09)
[0.02]
Bank Account
N (Total = 701) 173 173 164
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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TABLE H.3.3: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Both Screeners. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline -0.13 0.04 -0.40
(0.85) (0.85) (0.04)
[0.41] [0.78] [0.01]
Lies 0.17 -0.27
(0.85) (0.27)
[0.28] [0.07]
Costs -0.45
(0.03)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 777) 203 177 199
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
TABLE H.3.4: Estimated Dierence in Satisfaction with Mayor (One Way ANOVA)
Both Screeners. Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline -0.20 0.01 -0.34
(0.52) (0.90) (0.10)
[0.16] [0.90] [0.02]
Lies 0.22 -0.13
(0.52) (0.72)
[0.13] [0.36]
Costs 0.35
(0.10)
[0.01]
Bank Account
N (Total = 777) 203 177 199
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Appendix I: Heterogeneous Treatment Eects. Private Versus Public Hos-
pital Attendance.
Table I.3.1: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Public Hospital Only. Passed Screener
Study # 1
Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
No Corruption -2.93 -3.70 -3.72 -3.69 -3.60
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Baseline -0.77 -0.80 -0.76 -0.67
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Health Care/Bank Account -0.02 0.01 0.10
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
[0.93] [0.96] [0.68]
Health Care/Reelection 0.04 0.12
(1.00) (1.00)
[0.89] [0.63]
Computer/Bank Account 0.09
(1.00)
[0.73]
Computer/Reelection
N (Total = 427 ) 62 82 71 72 73
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Table I.3.2: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Private Hospital Only. Passed Screener
Study # 1
Baseline Health Care/ Health Care/ Computer/ Computer/
Bank Account Reelection Bank Account Reelection
No Corruption -3.86 -4.13 -4.30 -4.56 -4.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Baseline -0.26 -0.44 -0.70 -0.28
(1.00) (1.00) (0.21) (1.00)
[0.37] [0.14] [0.02] [0.34)
Health Care/Bank Account -0.17 -0.44 -0.02
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
[0.56] [0.15] [0.95]
Health Care/Reelection -0.26 0.15
(1.00) (1.00)
[0.39] [0.61]
Computer/Bank Account 0.42
(1.00)
[0.18]
Computer/Reelection
N (Total = 325) 59 57 55 50 53
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Table I.3.3: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Public Hospital Attendance. At Least One Screener
Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline 0.03 -0.41 -0.48
(1.00) (0.04) (0.02)
[0.85] [0.01] [0.00]
Procedural -0.44 -0.52
(0.03) (0.02)
[0.01] [0.00]
Health Care -0.08
(1.00)
[0.66]
Bank Account
N (Total = 812) 216 199 180
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
Table I.3.4: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Private Hospital Attendance. At Least One Screener
Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline -0.17 -0.38 -0.82
(0.54) (0.14) (0.00)
[0.38] [0.04] [0.00]
Procedural -0.21 -0.66
(0.54) (0.00)
[0.27] [0.00]
Health Care -0.44
(0.07)
[0.02]
Bank Account
N (Total = 660) 155 174 172
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Table I.3.5: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Public Hospital. At Least One Screener
Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline 0.21 0.12 -0.35
(0.58) (0.90) (0.12)
[0.19] [0.45] [0.03]
Lies -0.09 -0.57
(0.90) (0.00)
[0.57] [0.00]
Costs -0.47
(0.02)
[0.00]
Bank Account
N (Total = 823) 194 213 206
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
Table I.3.6: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
Private Hospital. At Least One Screener
Study # 3
Lies Costs Bank Account
Baseline -0.01 0.04 -0.27
(1.00) (1.00) (0.55)
[0.98] [0.83] [0.11]
Lies 0.04 -0.26
(1.00) (0.55)
[0.81] [0.12]
Costs -0.30
(0.50)
[0.08]
Bank Account
N (Total = 698) 182 156 172
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Appendix J. Dierence in Vote Intention. Subjects who Didn't Answer
Correctly the Audit Court Question.
TABLE J.3.1: Estimated Dierence in Vote Intention (One Way ANOVA)
No Audit Court Knowledge. At Least One Screener
Study # 2
Procedural Health Care Bank Account
Baseline 0.13 -0.07 -0.45
(1.00) (1.00) (0.16)
[0.53] [0.73] [0.03]
Procedural -0.20 -0.58
(0.98) (0.03)
[0.33] [0.00]
Health Care -0.38
(0.28)
[0.07]
Bank Account
N (Total = 650) 171 164 152
P-values in parenthesis for a t-test of the null hypothesis with Holm adjustment.
P-values in brackets for a t-test of the null hypothesis with no adjustment.
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Appendix K. Public Costs Versus Private Gain in Real News Examples
Accused Public Costs Private Gain Source
Mayor of municipality
in the state of Paraba.
Over-invoicing in pub-
lic purchases of 66,400
scholar kits.
{ See source reference
#1.
Mayor of municipality
in the state of Rio
Grande do Norte.
No-bid contracts and
money diversion from
an education program.
Evidence that the
money was diverted
for mayor's illegal
enrichment.
See source reference
# 2.
Mayor, vice-mayor and
various city council-
men in the state of
Piau.
Money diverted from
programs to support
public schools.
Money diverted bene-
ted mayor's relatives
with over-priced
salaries.
See source reference
# 3.
Mayor of municipality
in the state of Amapa.
{ Mayor created a fake
civil association to di-
vert public funds to
benet himself, rela-
tives and allies.
See source reference
# 4.
Mayor in municipality
in the state of Santa
Catarina.
Over-priced contracts
and fake bids in
expenses for public
works.
Diverted funds dis-
tributed among mayor
and participants in the
scheme.
See source reference
# 5.
Mayor in municipality
in the state of Alagoas.
Money diverted in
funds for public health
programs.
{ See source reference
# 6.
Mayor in municipality
in the state of Espritu
Santo.
Money diverted in
funds allegedly used
to support a charity
association.
Funds were distributed
among mayor and
other participants in
the scheme.
See source reference
# 7.
Mayor in municipal-
ity in the state of
Maranh~ao.
Over-expenses in funds
destined to improve
health conditions in ru-
ral households.
{ See source reference
# 8.
Mayor in municipality
in the state of S~ao
Paulo.
Over-expenses in con-
tract for solid waste
collection.
{ See source reference
# 9.
Two mayors in munic-
ipality in the state of
Alaogas.
Irregular use of funds
that the federal gov-
ernment transferred to
build a primary health
care center. As a con-
sequence of those ir-
regularities, the con-
struction of the health
care center could not
be completed.
{ See source reference
# 10.
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Sources:
1. \Oposic~ao aponta superfaturamento na compra de kit escolar em S. Jose", G1 Vale
do Paraba e Regi~ao, February 24, 2014, http://g1.globo.com/sp/vale-do-paraiba-
regiao/noticia/2014/02/oposicao-aponta-superfaturamento-na-compra-de-kit-escolar-
em-s-jose.html
2. \Ex-prefeito de Tangara Giovannu Cesar e condenado por fraude e enriquecimento
ilcito", Blog do VT, October 6, 2014, http://www.blogdovt.com/index.php/14-simples-
noticia/5310-ex-prefeito-de-tangara-e-condenado-por-fraude-e-enriquecimento-ilicito
3. \Prefeito de Passagem Franca e Investigado por Desvio de Recursos", Capital
Teresina, March 13, 2015, http://www.capitalteresina.com.br/noticias/geral/prefeito-
de-passagem-franca-e-investigado-por-desvio-de-recursos-25963.html
4. \MP-AP Oferta Denuncia contra ex-prefeito Roberto Goes", Amapa 247, Septem-
ber 2, 2014, https://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/amapa247/152142/MP-AP-oferta-
den%C3%BAncia-contra-ex-prefeito-Roberto-G%C3%B3es.htm
5. \Escutas revelam megaesquema de corrupc~ao que teria desviado pelo menos R
100 mi em SC", UOL Notcias, April 30, 2013,
http://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2013/04/30/escutas-revelam-meg
aesquema-de-corrupcao-em-santa-catarina.htm
6. \TCU abre investigac~ao por uso irregular de verba do SUS em P~ao de Acu",
Reporter Alagoas, August 31, 2012, http://reporteralagoas.com.br/novo/tcu-abre-
investigacao-por-uso-irregular-de-verba-do-sus-em-pao-de-acucar/
7. \Tribunal de Contas do ES investiga suposto desvio de verba em Colatina", Diario
O Globo, June 6, 2013, http://g1.globo.com/espirito-santo/noticia/2013/06/tribunal-
de-contas-do-es-investiga-suposto-desvio-de-verba-em-colatina.html
8. \CGU condena ex-prefeito a devolver R$ 286 mil por irregularidades em conve^nios.",
Itapecuru Notcias, January 12, 2010,
http://www.itapecurunoticias.com/index.php?pag=noticias&acao=exibir&id=880
9. \Peixoto: Enriquecimento Ilcito em Contrato do Lixo, diz MP", August 6,
2015, http://gazetadetaubate.com.br/peixoto-enriquecimento-ilicito-em-contrato-do-
lixo-diz-mp/
10. \Ex-prefeitos Cristina Brand~ao e Bida ter~ao que devolver 190 mil aos cofres
publicos." Minuto Sert~ao, March 1, 2012,
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http://minutosertao.cadaminuto.com.br/noticia/1929/2012/03/01/ex-prefeitos-crist
ina-brandao-e-bida-terao-que-devolver-190-mil-aos-cofres-publicos
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Appendix L: Screeners
First Study Screener
Imagine now that this candidate was defeated in the elections and that another op-
ponent candidate won for a small dierence. But the dierence is not as important
as the problem that many persons do not read the instructions carefully. To show
that you read this don't choose any of the options below, just type the letter 'k' on
your keyboard and continue.
How satised would you feel with the results of the elections?
Not at all o o o o o o o Very satised
Second and Third Study Screeners:
First Screener:
In the last national elections candidates talked about dierent issues, such as the
state of the economy and corruption. Many times candidates talk about their plans
and people do not pay attention. Now we want to see if you are paying attention to
what you are reading. To show that you are paying attention, ignore the questions
below and choose None of the above and Poverty as your two answers.
In your opinion, what was the most important issue that candidates debated on dur-
ing the last election?
(1) Unemployment
(2) The state of the economy
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(3) Crime
(4) Poverty
(5) Ination
(6) Corruption
(7) Drugs
(8) Education
(9) Health
(10) None of the above
Second Screener:
There are many forms in which people receive information about their municipal-
ity. Some persons get their news from the radio, other talking with neighbors, and
other talks with coworkers or classmates. There are also persons who don't pay atten-
tion to the questions that researchers do. We want to see if you are paying attention.
To show that you read this, please ignore the question below and just choose the '-'
option at the very bottom of the list.
How do you regularly receive information about the situation in your municipality?
(1) Radio
(2) Newspaper
(3) TV
(4) Talking with neighbors
(5) Talking with family members
(6) Talking with coworkers
(7) Talking with classmates
(8) At Church
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(9) Internet websites
(10) Another form
(11) I don't receive information
(12) -
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